A Detailed Proposal For Paper Ballots
(Excerpted from "Don't Bother Contesting The Rigged Election in Scotland" - 09-21-14)
08-15-21
mpg

• That paper ballots are used.  The use of electronic voting machines would not be permitted, would be utterly unacceptable, and would in fact be illegal.
• That the ballot boxes are made out of lucite, or equivalent, tamper proof, durable, heavy duty, thick,  clear,  plastic.  The boxes should measure twenty seven square feet in size or better (3ft*3ft*3ft or better). 
• That the ballot boxes be unalterably numbered when manufactured, that tamper proof devices and unique identifiers be inserted into the plastic itself, without materially obscuring the interior in any way, during the manufacturing process to prevent their duplication.
• That the ballot boxes be manufactured so they are mechanically impossible to open without obvious  brute force methods until they arrive back at the counting facility, which would be equipped with the appropriate difficult to replicate device to unlock them, that the lock mechanism can be sealed with a tamper proof device when the boxes are assigned to their respective polling stations, and that the slots at the top of the boxes be of a sufficient size to admit only one ballot at a time.
• That the ballots are numbed on one side, upper right corner, and also on the detachable voter stub, in sequence as they are printed, and as with any currency, printed in ways according to industry standard that would prevent almost any possible method of duplication.  That they be issued in standardized packs of a hundred, two hundred, or five hundred, or whatever standardized size is convenient.
• That the production of the ballots and the ballot boxes be monitored, and their anti-tamper techniques be safe guarded.
  
• That the number of ballot packages to be assigned to each polling station be sufficient to account for all possible voters at that station.  That there is to be no shortfall, nor any excuse for a shortfall exceptable for any reason, under penalty of fine or sanction
  
• That the ballot boxes be assigned in random order.
  
• That the polling stations to be assigned their ballot packages be selected in random order.
• That the numerical sequence of each batch of ballot packages should not be known, nor will the ballot packages and ballot boxes be assigned and issued to their respective polling stations, until the day of the election. 
  
• That on the day of election the ballot packages will be assigned in numerical sequence to the polling stations according to the polling stations randomly selected order.
  
• That each batch of ballot's numerical sequence, the number of each ballot box, and the polling stations they were issued to, be legally recorded and attested to under penalties of perjury, and not made public till the polls are closed and the ballot boxes have been collected.
• That the name of the polling station be placed on the ballot boxes in a tamper proof way when they're assigned to their respective polling stations.
  
• That this information is to be maintained for a minimum of one year and must be made public the moment all the ballot boxes are collected.
  
• That this entire one day process be monitored from start to finish by delegates from the respective parties, neutral observers, and an independent auditing agency.
  
• That the ballot boxes and printed ballots be transported to the polling stations accompanied by delegates from the contesting parties and neutral and/or international observers
• That the voter's names must match those on the voter roles and that some form of verifiable identification is presented at that time of the vote
• That concise, easily understood, simple, procedures to register, and/or provide identification, be clearly spelled out to the voters one month prior to the election.
• That these procedures not be onerous in any way, that they apply to all registered voters equally, and that easy access, including registering at the polls at the time of the vote be made available.
• That it be notated on the voter role at the time when they have taken their vote.
• That these records be collected, and maintained in a secure facility, for a period of not less than one year.
• That procedures can be setup so that any voter can check on whether they cast their vote or not.
• That the ballots have a tear-off stub, with the ballot's numerical sequence also printed on it, that the voter can choose to take with them as proof of their vote.
• That each ballot package when opened at the polling station, be double checked as regards to it's numerical sequence (first and last number, Tip: they can be ruffled to easily view the entire sequence of numbers in the package) that it than be shuffled (like a deck of cards or some other similar procedure) and that the stack be turned face down in a dispenser, (a clear plastic tray) and finally that it be publicly handed to the voter, face down, with the numerical sequence not made visible.
  
• That a running count of the persons who take a vote is conducted at each polling place, that this count should match the totals shown on the voting roles as each voter is checked off, and that upon closing of the polls, these counts MUST MATCH the ballots issued to that polling station less the returned unused ballots, and any discarded ballots. -- (which must be kept and identified as to why they were discarded. -- Returned by voter, because they were torn, double checked, mis-checked, damaged, etc, a statement must be signed by the voter, identifying the voter, on the back of the returned ballot that they are being reissued another ballot upon return.  Or ballots removed from distribution before issue because they were damaged or unusable, these ballots cannot show any check marks.  These discards must be kept and returned to the counting facility)  These totals MUST reconcile.
• That each polling place be monitored, the ballot boxes be verified as empty at the start of the process, that they be in an open public space, and kept under observation at all times.
• That the slots the ballots are placed in be sealed upon completion of the election process with a tamper proof method. (Suggestion: a lock arrangement whereby a standard key is inserted by the drivers at pick-up which causes a spring loaded panel on the inside to snap shut.  Once tripped, it can only be opened from the inside. The key and lock should be sufficiently complex / unique to prevent duplication or activation by people attempting to close the boxes and sabotage the vote)
  
• That their transport from the polling stations to the counting facility be accompanied by delegates from both parties, and neutral and/or international observers
• That they be taken to a secure facility where the count is monitored by the same, under the watchful eye of video cameras.  That this facility should be open, accessible, but secure.  Steps should be taken  to avoid any disruptions, such as the setting off of fire alarms, power outages, bomb threats, smoke devices, and other acts of sabotage or disruptions.
  
• That the ballots numerical sequence and the ballot boxes they are removed from match the polling places they were issued to.
• That the total ballots counted from the each polling station must match the total voters counted at each polling station along with the totals from the voter roles from each station, and that the total ballots issued to each polling station must match these counts less unused and discarded ballots. These totals MUST reconcile
• That upon any discrepancies or reasonable challenge by any observer regarding a particular polling station's ballot count once it's completed, that the ballots be pulled, that they be placed in numerical sequence, that the totals be re-reconciled and the counts of the ballots and those of the voter roles be  re-checked.
• That no interruption of the vote count is to be tolerated under any circumstance.
• That statistically randomized (every second person, every third person, etc.) exit polls be conducted during the entire election process at a sufficient number and variety of polling stations to be representative according to industry standards, and that the results may not be released, or even hinted at, until after the polls are closed.
• That political activity be kept two hundred feet from polling places one hour prior to, during, and one hour after the election takes place.
• Finally that any person found violating the electoral process or procedures as outlined above, with the intent to alter, change or defraud the vote, if convicted should receive a minimum of ten years in prison and a one hundred thousand dollar fine, or equivalent.
• With the exception that anyone found attempting to alter, change or defraud the vote, and who are also involved in any part of the manufacturing process for the ballots, the ballot boxes, the tamper proof seals, are auditors assigned to monitor the election, anyone who attests to the electoral process under penalties of perjury, or anyone employed in the government's security forces, unformed or not, that if convicted they be subject to a minimum of fifteen years in prison and a five hundred thousand dollar fine, or equivalent. - mpg