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Iran's Nuclear Program
6-part series by Muhammad Sahimi published in Payvand
Part
I: Its History, 02 October 2003
Part
II: Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary?, 03 October 2003
Part
III: The Emerging Crisis, 06 October 2003
Part
IV: Economic Analysis of the Program, 07 December 2004
Part
V: From the United States Offering Iran Uranium Enrichment
Technology to Suggestions for Creating Catastrophic Industrial Failure,
22 December 2004
Part
VI: The European Union's Proposal, Iran's Defiance, and the
Emerging Crisis, 09 September 2005
Part I:
Its History
On
February 9, 2003,
Iran's program and efforts for building sophisticated facilities at
Natanz and and several other cities that would eventually produce
enriched uranium were revealed. President Mohammad Khatami announced
the existence of the Natanz (and other) facilities on Iran's television
and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit
them. Then, in late February, Dr. Mohammad El Baradei, the head of
IAEA, accompanied by a team of inspectors, visited Iran. Since then,
the IAEA's experts and inspectors have visited Iran several more times.
A preliminary report was published in July, with a follow up report on
August 26. On September 12, 2003, the IAEA gave Iran an ultimatum to
reveal all the details of its nuclear activities by October 31, 2003.
Iran's
nuclear
program and activities, though discussed for many years, have come into
sharp focus since the February announcement. The information and data
that have been obtained by the IAEA, after visiting the Natanz facility
and a few other locations, have surprised the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and Japan. Similar to the Clinton
administration, the Bush administrtation has been suspicious of Iran's
nuclear program, arguing that, having vast oil and natural gas
reserves, Iran hardly needs nuclear energy. Hence, the Bush
administration argues that the primary purpose of Iran's nuclear
program is developing nuclear weapons. The EU, which is negotiating
with Iran extensive economic and cultural agreements; Russia, which is
completing construction of nuclear reactors in Bushehr and hoping to
build many more reactors in Iran, and Japan, which is hoping to sign a
lucrative oil agreement with Iran for developing Iran's huge Azaadegaan
oil field (the largest oil field in the Middle East), have all pressed
Iran hard, demanding that it reveal all the secret details of its
nuclear program and facilities.
Note
that, according
to the original IAEA safeguard agreements, Iran did not have to declare
the start of construction of the Natanz facility. These agreements
stipulate that, only 180 days before introducing any nuclear material,
does Iran have to declare the existence of the facility. Therefore,
construction of the undeclared Natanz facility was NOT illegal. In
addition, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows Iran to
legally build any nuclear facility, including one for uranium
enrichment, so long as it is intended for peaceful purposes. Moreover,
the NPT allows the member states to withdraw from the agreement,
subject to giving a 90 days notice to the IAEA, if they believe that
abiding by the terms of the NPT threatens their national security (in
the language of the NPT, if it is in their "Supreme Interest").
Aside
from the
political confrontation that the revelations about Iran's nuclear
program have created between Iran on one hand, and the US and her
allies on the other hand, the questions that I believe we Iranians must
ask and debate, are: Does Iran need nuclear energy, and is acquiring it
in its national interests? Before starting to debate these
all-important questions, however, we must first decouple Iran's need
for nuclear energy from its alleged or real intentions for producing
nuclear weapons.
This
article
represents the first of a three-part series in which these two
important questions are discussed, and Iran's nuclear program is
described and analyzed in detail. In the present article, the history
of Iran's program for nuclear research and development is reviewed. The
significance of this review is twofold. (1) History shows that the US
and her allies were in fact the driving force behind the birth of
Iran's nuclear program in the late 1960s and early 1970s. (2) It is
also particularly important to recognize that since the late 1980s,
when Iran restarted its nuclear program, the US and her allies have
been given every opportunity to participate in the development and
construction of nuclear reactors in Iran, which would have provided
them with significant control on the reactors and their products, but
that they have always refused to do so.
Although
various
portions of Part I (the present article) have been published before, it
may be useful to put all the pieces together in order to present a
cohesive and brief review of the historty of Iran's nuclear program,
and to make it available through an easily-accesible web site. In this
author's opinion, this may be particularly useful for the young
generation of Iranians who may be interested in this history, and the
important role that the US played in the birth of Iran's nuclear
program.
Part II
will discuss
why Iran must stop relying almost exclusively on oil and gas as her
sole sources of energy, and start developing alternative sources, the
most advanced of which are nuclear reactors. There are compelling
economical, social, and environmental reasons for seeking alternative
sources of energy for Iran, which will be described in detail in Part
II.
Part III
will
describe, in simple terms, how violations of the NPT are detected, and
what the major issues are at the center of the dispute between Iran and
the IAEA. The dispute - some call it a crisis - is in fact mostly
between Iran on one hand, and the US and some of her allies on the
other hand, with the IAEA being used as a tool in a political battle.
Before
embarking on
this task, we must recognize that the development of adequate energy
resources is a highly important part of the national interests of every
nation which, by their very definition, transcend the political system
that governs a nation. Both Democratic and Replublican administrations
in the US, and their allies, such as Britain, have waged wars, invaded
and occupied oil-producing countries, and engineered coups to overthrow
the legal, often democratically-elected, governments of oil-producing
countries in order to control the world's oil reserves. They have
always justified their deed solely based on protecting their national
interests and national security. We only need to recall what happened
in Iran in 1953, after Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh nationalized Iran's oil
industry, and the recent invasion and occupation of Iraq by the US and
Britain, to understand this. The same principles are also applicable to
Iran, namely, that she has a fundamental right for securing adequate
energy resources - the engine for her development and advancement.
Iran's
foray into
nuclear research and development began in the mid 1960s under the
auspices of the US within the framework of bilateral agreements between
the two countries. The first significant nuclear facility built by the
Shah was the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), founded in 1967,
housed at Tehran University, and run by Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran (AEOI). This Center has always been one of Iran's primary open
nuclear research facilities. It has a safeguarded 5-megawatt nuclear
research reactor that was supplied by the US in 1967. The reactor can
produce up to 600 grams of plutonium per year in its spent fuel.
Iran
signed the NPT
on July 1, 1968. After the Treaty was ratified by the Majles, it went
into effect on March 5, 1970. In the language of Article IV of the
Treaty, the NPT recognized Iran's "inalienable right to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful proposes
without discrimination, and acquire equipment, materials, and
scientific and technological information." The events of the early
1970s were, however, instrumental in shaping and accelerating the
development of Iran's nuclear program. The 1973 war between the Arab
countries and Israel, and the subsequent huge increase in the price of
oil, provided the Shah's government with considerable resources for
Iran's development. At that time, a study by the influential Stanford
Research Institute concluded that Iran would need, by the year 1990, an
electrical capacity of about 20,000-megawatt.
According
to
declassified confidential US Government documents posted on the Digital
National Security Archive (see the article, "The US-Iran Nuclear
Dispute: Dr Mohamed El Baradei's Mission Possible to Iran," by Drs. A.
Etemad and N. Meshkati, published on July 13, 2003, in the Iran News),
in the mid-1970s, the US encouraged Iran to expand her non-oil energy
base, suggested to the Shah that Iran needed not one but SEVERAL
nuclear reactors to acquire the electrical capacity that the Stanford
Research Institute had proposed, and expressed interest in the US
companies participating in Iran's nuclear energy projects. Building
these reactors, and selling the weapons that the Shah was procuring
from the US in the 1970s, were, of course, a good way for the US to
recover the cost of the oil that she was buying from Iran.
Since the
Shah never
read or heard an American proposal that he did not like, he started an
ambitious program for building many (presumably as many as TWENTY
THREE) nuclear reactors. Hence, his government awarded a contract to
Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens) of (West) Germany to
construct two Siemens 1,200-megawatt nuclear reactors at Bushehr. The
work for doing so began in 1974. In 1975, the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology signed a contract with the AEOI for providing training
for the first cadre of Iranian nuclear engineers, and the
Iranian-Indian nuclear cooperation treaty was also signed (India is now
a nuclear power). In addition, the Nuclear Technology Center at Esfahan
(Isfahan) was founded in the mid-1970s with the French assistance in
order to provide training for the personnel that would be working with
the Bushehr reactors. The Esfahan Center currently operates four small
nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China.
According
to the same
declassified document mentioned above, in an address to the symposium,
"The US and Iran, An Increasing Partnership," held in October 1977, Mr.
Sydney Sober, a representative of the US State Department, declared
that the Shah's government was going to purchase EIGHT nuclear reactors
from the US for generating electricity. On July 10, 1978, only seven
months before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the final
draft of the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed. The agreement
was supposed to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy
and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to
Iran's nuclear energy program. Iran was also to receive American
technology and help in searching for uranium deposits.
The
Shah's government
had also envisioned building two nuclear reactors and a power plant in
Darkhovin, on the Karoon River, south of the city of Ahvaz. Iran
signed, in 1974, a contract with the French company Framatome to build
two 950 megawatt pressurized reactors at that site. Framatome did
survey the area and began site preparation. However, construction had
not yet started when the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan
cancelled the contract after the Islamic revolution in 1979. In 1992,
Iran signed an agreement with China for building the reactors in
Darkhovin, but the terms of the agreement have not yet been carried out
by China. Given the proximity of the site to the border with Iraq, it
is probably not prudent to proceed with that project at that particular
site.
The
Shah's government
also obtained uranium materials from South Africa in the 1970s.
According to Dr. Akbar Etemad, who was the founder and first President
of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran from 1974 to 1978, the TNRC
carried out experiments in which plutonium was extracted from spent
fuel using chemical agents (see, A. Etemad, "Iran," in, "European
Non-Proliferation Policy," edited by H. Mueller, Oxford University
Press, 1987, page 9). Note that the only use for plutonium is in a
nuclear bomb. It is also believed that the Shah assembled at the TNRC a
nuclear weapon design team. Asadollah Alam, the long-time Imperial
Court Minister and the Shah's close confidant, wrote in his memoires
that the Shah had envisioned Iran having nuclear weapons.
In
February 1979,
when the Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah's government, the
Bushehr-1 (that is, reactor 1) was 90% complete and 60% of its
equipment had been installed, while Bushehr-2 was 50% complete. Had the
1979 Revolution not happened, the Kraftwerk Union would have continued
its work in all likelihood with the cooperation of the US corporation
Bechtel Power, which was its joint-venture partner in many power plant
projects around the world. The government of Prime Minister Mehdi
Bazargan then decided that Iran did not need nuclear energy, and
therefore the work at Bushehr was halted after the victory of the
Revolution in February 1979. The German firm had left Iran earlier,
anyway.
During
its war with
Iran, Iraq bombed the Bushehr site six times (in March 1984, February
1985, March 1985, July 1986, and twice in November 1987), which
destroyed the entire core area of both reactors. According to officials
of Technischer Ueberwachungsverein, Germany's National Reactor
Inspectorate, before the bombings, Bushehr-1 could have been completed
in about three years. Note, however, that, at the time of the bombings,
none of the main equipments had been installed, and in fact two steam
generators (that use the heat from the reactors to produce steam to be
used in power generators) were stored in Italy, while the pressure
vessel for Bushehr-1 was stored in Germany.
The
Revolution and
its aftermath, and the eight-year war with Iraq which resulted in
colossal damage to Iran's infrastructure, reduced temporarily Iran's
thirst for electricity. After the war with Iraq ended, however, Iran
began to rethink her position regarding nuclear energy and technology,
although it would not be unreasonable to believe that Iraq's savage
bombing of Iran's main population and industrial centers, and the
missile attacks that it carried out against Tehran during 1986-1987,
also motivated Iran's leaders to think about nuclear technology. The
first reconstruction and development plan proposed and carried out by
President Hashemi Rafsanjani's government, coupled with Iran's chronic
shortage of electricity that went back to the early 1970s, and the
rapid growth of her population, were three major reasons for Iran to
restart her neclear program for obtaining electricity.
Rafsanjani's
government first approached Kraftwerk Union to complete the Bushehr
project. However, under the US pressure, Kraftwerk Union refused. Iran
then asked Germany to allow Kraftwerk to ship the reactor components
and technical documentation that it had paid for, citing a 1982
International Commerce Commission (ICC) ruling under which Siemens was
obligated to deliver all plant materials and components stored outside
Iran, but the German government still refused to do so. In response,
Iran filed a lawsuit in August 1996 with the ICC, asking for $5.4
billion in compensation for Germany's failure to comply with the 1982
ruling. The issue is still unsettled.
In the
late 1980s, a
consortium of companies from Argentina, Germany and Spain submitted a
proposal to Iran to complete the Bushehr-1 reactor, but huge pressure
by the US stopped the deal. The US pressure also stopped in 1990
Spain's National Institute of Industry and Nuclear Equipment to
complete the Bushehr project. Iran also tried, unsuccessfully, to
procure components for the Bushehr reactors, but her attempts were
blunted by the US. For example, in 1993, Iran tried to acquire eight
steam condensers, built by the Italian firm Ansaldo under the Kraftwerk
Union contract, but they were seized by the Italian government. The
Czech firm Skoda Plzen also discussed supplying reactor components to
Iran, but, under the US pressure, negotiations were cancelled in 1994.
Iran was also not successful in her attempt to buy nuclear power
reactor components from an unfinished reactor of Polland.
After
years of
searching in the West for a supplier to complete her first nuclear
power plant, Iran turned to the Soviet Union and then Russia. She
signed, in March 1990, her first protocol on the Bushehr project with
the Soviet Union. The agreement called on Moscow to complete the
Bushehr project and build additional two reactors in Iran, but
financial problems delayed the deal.
China, in
1991,
provided Iran with uranium hexafluoride (a uranium compound, which is
gaseous state, and used for enriching uranium; see Part III) which is,
however, under the IAEA safeguard. In addition, Iran recently
acknowleged that she also received (again in 1991) from China 1,000 kgr
of natural uranium hexafluoride, 400 kgr of uranium tetrafluoride, and
400 kgr of uranium dioxide, without reporting them to the IAEA.
Although the amount of the (until-recently undeclared) uranium
compounds is small, what has been done with them is more indicative of
the real intentions behind obtaining the materials. In 1993, the AEOI
and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed an agreement for the
construction of two Russian reactors at Bushehr, but the contract was
never carried out as Iran was facing major financial problems.
Finally,
Iran signed,
in January 1995, a contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
to finish the reactors at Bushehr. These reactors will be under the
IAEA safeguards, and will be capable of producing up to 180 kgr/year of
plutonium in their spent fuel. The agreement called for Russia to
complete the first reactor at Bushehr within four years, although it is
still unfinished; to provide a 30-50 megawatt thermal light-water
research reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium, and training for about
15 Iranian nuclear scientists per year. Iran and Russia also agreed to
discuss the construction of a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment
facility in Iran. However, in May 1995, the US announced that it had
convinced Russia to cancel the centrifuge agreement, although Russia
later denied that the agreement with Iran ever existed! The light-water
research reactor deal has also been cancelled.
After the
1995
agreement was signed by Iran and Russia, the Clinton administration
tried, unsuccessfully, to convince Russia to cancel the agreement, but
its entreaties were rebuffed by Russia which saw the Bushehr project as
an openning for her ailing nuclear industry to get itself into the
international market. Having failed in its attempts, the Clinton
administration then began charging that the plutonium that the reactors
would produce would be used by Iran for making nuclear weapons.
However, this issue is also being addressed by Iran and Russia, since
they are negotiating an agreement by which the nuclear wastes from the
Bushehr reactors would be returned to Russia which has a large facility
for storing the wastes in southern Siberia (although Russian
environmental laws appear to forbid storing nuclear wastes of another
country in Russia), but no agreement has been reached yet. It was
reported recently that Iran has demanded payments for returning the
spent fuel to Russia, contending that she pays to buy the fuel from
Russia in the first place, and therefore she should also be paid for
the spent fuel. If ture, this would be an absurd demand, because if
Russia is to pay for Iran's nuclear wastes, she should also be paid for
keeping Iran's nuclear wastes! The issue of who should pay whom appears
to be the only obstacle to reaching an agreement between Iran and
Russia concerning the nuclear wastes.
After it
appeared
that the plutonium issue would be addressed by Russia, the US, under
huge pressure by Israel, began claiming that, while the Bushehr
reactors cannot be directly used for making nuclear weapons, they will
train a generation of Iranian scientists and engineers for operating
the reactor, which in turn will prepare Iran for making nuclear
weapons. Is there any merit to this charge? Having a nuclear reactor is
NOT necessary for obtaining the necessary know-how for developing a
nuclear bomb (although it certainly helps). The best example is
provided by Iraq. Israel bombed and destroyed Iraq's only nuclear
reactor at Osirak in 1981, before it started operating, yet when its
nuclear weapon program was discovered after the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq was
only months away from making a nuclear bomb!
Most
experts believe
that the completion of the Bushehr project by Russia is a highly
complex task: As mentioned earlier, the Kraftwerk Union has not
provided any technical documents to either Iran or Russia. Since Russia
plans to install a reactor, her engineers must modify what Kraftwerk
Union had left behind to accomodate the Russian reactor and its support
system, which differ in many significant ways from the German reactor.
For example, the structure of the steam generators in the Russian
reactors is significantly different from the original German reactors.
The reactor is supposed to start operating in early 2004.
In
addition to the
what has been described so far, Iran does have a few other nuclear
facilities. One is the Bonaab Atomic Energy Research Center (which is
south of city of Tabriz), which is a research center for applications
of nuclear technology in agriculture. In addition, Center for
Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Karaj (near Tehran) was
inaugurated on in May 1991, and is run by the AEOI. None of these is,
however, considered to be for military applications.
This
concludes the review of the history of Iran's nuclear program. The
review reveals three important facts:
(1)
Nuclear research,
facilities, and reactors, and even the vision for Iran having nuclear
weapons, were all conceived and initiated by the Shah and his
government, with the direct assistance and encouragement by the US and
her allies. This is very much similar to what happened in Israel, which
developed her arsenal of nuclear weapons with the direct help of the US
and France. They were not conceived or initiated after the Revolution.
In fact, for the first few years after the Revolution, Iran rejected
nuclear reactors!
(2) It is
clear that
the US and her allies have had many opportunities to complete the
Bushehr project, or to participate in the construction of other nuclear
reactors, and, hence, to have significant control on the reactors, but
they have always refused to take part.
(3) In
addition, the
US and her allies could have participated in the Bushehr project by
helping Iran improve the safety of the reactors there and, hence, have
influence on their operations. As pointed out by Drs. Etemad and
Meshkati (see their article cited earlier), there is good precedence
for this: The Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, the
construction of which began during the Soviet Union, when the former
communist government was in power in Czechoslovakia, but was halted in
1992. In 1994, with a $317 million loan guarantee from the United
States Export-Import Bank, an American company, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, participated in completing the Temelin's reactors.
Hence,
there is no
way of avoiding the conclusion that the real goal of the United States
is dismantling Iran's nuclear infrastructure, regardless of its
orientation, and to despatch Iran to the era of nuclear, scientific and
technological illiteracy, which is in violation of the letter and
spirit of the NPT.
Part II
of this
series will discuss why Iran must stop relying exclusively on oil and
gas, and develop alternative sources of energy, and in particular
nuclear energy.
Original
URL: http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html
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Part II:
Are Nuclear Reactors Necessary?
In the
present
article, Part II of a three-part series, the need for building nuclear
reactors in Iran is analyzed. As was pointed out in Part I, in the
opinion of this author, the questions that we Iranians must ask and
debate, are: Does Iran need nuclear energy, and is acquiring it in her
national interests? It was also pointed out that one must decouple
Iran's need for nuclear energy which, as argued in this article, is
completely legitimate on economical, social, and environmental grounds,
from her alleged or real intentions for producing nuclear weapons.
Recall
that the main
argument of the United States against nuclear energy for Iran is that,
Iran has vast oil and gas reserves, and hence she needs no nuclear
reactor. This argument is, in general, not necessarily valid. Many
countries that are rich in fossil energy resources, including Britain
and Russia (both oil exporters), rely on nuclear power for a
significant portion of their energy needs, while Germany, France,
Japan, and many other countries, which have no oil or natural gas
reserves, have not abandoned nuclear power in favor of more imported
oil and gas, even though they can certainly afford this. There are
currently 1118 nuclear reactors in the world of which 280 are for
nuclear research, while another 400 are used in ships and submarines
for producing power. The remaining 438 nuclear reactors are used for
generating electricity, of which 104 are in the US, 59 in France, 53 in
Japan, 29 in Russia, and 19 are in Germany. Between 1974, when Iran
signed her first agreement for building nuclear reactors, and 2000, use
of nuclear reactors for generating electricity has increased by a
factor of 12!
In the
particular
case of Iran, the US argument that Iran needs no nuclear energy has no
validity at all. While it is true that Iran does have vast oil and gas
reserves, she also needs alternative energy sources. I argue that
Iran's needs for such alternatives are glaring and indisputable, and I
base my arguments on economical, social, and environmental
considerations.
We first,
however, consider the case for alternative sources of energy on general
grounds:
Most of
the world's
major oil exporters, such as Iran, are developing nations. Thus, these
countries must confront the challenge of their demographic explosion
without possessing many of the necessary tools, which are strong state
structures, rapidly-growing economies, large amounts of investment
capitals, numerous entrepreneurs, engineers and inventors, and
infrastructres that are reasonably advanced. In fact, we live in a
world in which technology and capital are in the countries that are
energy-hungry - those that have no major oil reserves of their own (for
example, Germany, France, and Japan) or have at best indeaquate sources
(for example, the US) - whereas the population growth and social and
political turbulence are in the developing countries that are major oil
producers (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Iraq, etc.).
At the
same time, oil
is a non-renewable national wealth of Iran (and other oil exporters).
Once it is produced and exported, it can never be regenerated. One
cannot expect Iran (and other oil-exporting countries) to deplete her
non-renewable national wealth recklessly, without receiving any lasting
products or benefits in return, but this will happen if Iran's sources
for energy are not diversified, and she continues to rely almost
exclusively on oil and gas for everything from the only source of
energy to her annual budget. Except for Norway, every major oil
exporter (including Russia) relies heavily on its revenue from oil
sales, so much so that if the oil price stays too low for too long, we
may have social instability and even revolution in these countries.
What would happen to these countries if all of their recoverable oil
and gas are rapidly depleted over a few decades, which would be the
case if they rely on oil and gas for everything from their annual
budget to energy sources?
In
addition, a set of
practical issues, which are important to the industrialized nations
(notably in the Western hemisphere), must be addressed: What would
happen to the West's huge chemical industry that uses oil- and
gas-derived materials for its production and is an important source of
jobs, if the world's oil and gas reserves are depleted too quickly?
What would be the fate of the German plastic factories and the US
polymer producers (plastics and polymers are some of the most heavily
used materials in the world) that get their raw materials from the same
source, and to the enormous petrochemical complexes around the world,
if oil and gas resources are quickly depleted? Is it not better to
develop alternative sources of energy, and use oil and gas more slowly
and in more useful ways, by producing oil- and gas-derived materials
and products that have much added values? If the answer to this
question is yes, then why can Iran not use this argument?
Next,
consider the case for alternative energy sources from an economical
view point:
Iran's 60
major oil
fields are mostly old, with some being depleted altogether. From 1979
until 1997 no major investment was made in Iran's oil industry. A study
in 1998 concluded that, out of the 60 oil fields, 57 of them need major
technical studies, repairs, upgrading, and repressurizing which would
require, over a 15 year period, $40 billion! Although, since 1997, Iran
has had considerable success in attracting foreign capital for its
offshore oil and gas reserves, it is still far behind other oil
exporting countries of the Middle East in terms of developing her
fossil energy resources. Iran has not even been able to increase her
oil production to the pre-Revolution level of 5.5 million barrels/day.
If Iran cannot upgrade her oil facilities and industry on a timely
manner, it will lose her market share. While there is no doubt that the
solution to the urgent problem of upgrading Iran's oil industry is
partly political, lack of any solution will have deep implications for
Iran's future, which are discussed shortly.
At the
same time,
since early 1990s, Iran's consumption of oil has been increasing at an
alarming rate of 8% per year, and her total energy consumption has
increased from 1.6 quadrillion Btu (quads) in 1980 to more than 5.5
quads at present - an increase of more than 280%. If this trend
continues, Iran will become a net oil importer by 2010, a gigantic
catastrophe for a country which relies on oil for 80% of her foreign
currency and 45% of her total annual budget. If that happens, how will
Iran be able to feed her population, estimated to reach 100 million by
2025, and also spend on her development and national security? The fact
is that, despite considerable efforts over the past 30 years, Iran's
industrial output, aside from her oil industry, accounts for only 15%
of her gross domestic product.
In one of
the rare
occasions that he said something profound, the Shah once stated that a
barrel of oil is too precious (he used the word "sharif" in Persian to
describe oil) to be used for generating electricity. Paraphrasing him,
I would say that a million cubic feet of gas is too precious to burn;
natural gas should be used for generating huge amounts of petrochemical
products with much added values, which is precisely what Iran has been
trying to do: Iran curently produces about $2.7 billion/year worth of
petrochemical products. At the same time, in 40-50 years, when oil will
no longer be the major source of energy and will be replaced by gas,
Iran (the gas reserves of which will last for at least 200 years) will
be in an excellent position to be the main supplier to Asia and Europe.
Therefore, why should Iran use her hard-earned oil and gas for
generating electricity, if she can develop alternative sources of
energy?
Looking
at this issue
from another angle, it is estimated that Iran's known uranium ore
reserves can produce as much electricity as 45 BILLION barrels of oil.
This is a huge amount by any criterion, but particularly so if we only
recall that Iran's known oil reserves are currently estimated to be
about 96 billion barrels. In other words, if we can extract all of
Iran's known oil reserves (a remote possibility!) and use about half of
them just for producing electricity, we will generate as much
electricity as what Iran's presently-known uranium deposits can
produce! It would therefore be absolutely foolish not to do this!
Consider
this problem
from a third angle: Iran's present installed electrical capacity is
more than the 20,000 megawatt that had been predicted for 1990.
However, Iran's annual growth in demand for electricity is 5-8%. Hence,
it is estimated that, by the year 2010, Iran will need another
7,000-megawatt of electricity which, ignoring all other factors (see
above and below), and even under the best possible circumstances,
namely, immediate lifting of the US sanctions against Iran and flow of
vast investment capital into Iran's oil and gas industry, cannot be
produced by oil and gas alone. Therefore, the question is: What is Iran
supposed to do?
One of
the main
arguments that some of the experts on nuclear weapons present against
Iran having nuclear energy is that, it is not economical for Iran to
generate electricity using nuclear reactors, because she has vast gas
reserves which can be used for producing electricity. To support their
arguments, these experts usually cite studies that estimate that the
cost to finish the Bushehr nuclear reactors will be $1,000 per
installed kilowatt, while the electricity from natural gas-fired power
plants costs $600-800 per kilowatt. However, such arguments are not
valid. In addition to the necessity of,
(1) using
the gas for producing petrochemical products with much added values
(see above);
(2)
preserving much
of Iran's gas reserves for her future generations and to position Iran
in 40-50 years as the main supplier of energy to Europe and Asia, and
(3)
avoiding the
severe adverse effect of burning gas and the resulting carbon emission
which is the major culprit in global warming and the greenhouse effect
(see below),
the above
estimates
are simply wrong, because they do not take into account the huge costs
of the medical care for people who suffer from the diseases caused by
pollution of the environment by oil and gas, as well as the damage to
nature caused by carbon emission and the resulting global warming.
In 1990,
in a seminar
at Gustave E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies of the
University of California in Los Angeles (the complete content of that
seminar was published later; see, M. Sahimi, "How Much do We Pay for a
Barrel of Oil?" in, "Proceedings of the Third International Conference
on Non-Renewable Energy Sources," Tehran, Iran, December 1993; see
also, M. Sahimi, "Factors Affecting the Development of Fossil Energy
Resources of Developing Countries," in, "United States-Third World
Relations in the New World Order," edited by A.P. Grammy and C.K.
Bragg, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 1996, page 361), this author
stated that:
"Typical
estimates
for the cost of producing electricity and other forms of energy using
oil and gas are only based on their market prices. However, these
prices reflect only the cost of producing oil and gas (including the
costs of of labor and materials used for their extraction from
underground reservoirs) and of transporting them to the consumer. But
some of the costs of consuming oil and gas are not directly included in
our energy bill, nor are they paid for by the companies that sell us
energy. These are the hidden costs of oil and gas that we pay
indirectly for the health problems caused by air, water and soil
pollution resulting from using oil and gas, environmental degradation
caused by carbon emission and global warming, and acid rains. Since the
producers and consumers do not pay directly for such costs, society as
a whole must pay for them. Thus, although such costs are hidden, they
are real. For example, according to the American Lung Association,
health costs, including, for example, lost potential income, of air
pollution alone are estimated to be about $50 billion a year, and the
main culprit for air pollution is the fossil fuels, mainly oil and gas,
our primary source of energy. Estimating the possible cost of the
damage inflicted on Earth by global warming, caused by carbon emission
that is the direct result of burning oil AND gas, is currently
impossible."
If we
take into
account such costs, then the cost of producing electricity from gas
(and oil) will be much larger than the commercial estimates usually
quoted, and very much comparable with what it costs to generate it
using nuclear reactors. A recent study by Professors John Deutch and
Ernest Moniz of, respectively, the chemistry and physics departments of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reached a similiar conclusion
(see, the New York Times, the Op-Ed page, Thursday August 14, 2003).
Consider
now the case for alternative sources of energy in terms of Iran's
population growth and her social dynamics:
Since the
1979
Revolution, Iran's population has more than doubled, from 32 to nearly
70 million, while her oil production is only 70% of the pre-Revolution
level. This then begs the following question: Why is it that the US and
her allies believed, in the 1970s, that Iran needed nuclear reactors
and nuclear energy, when Iran's population was less than half of the
present and her oil production was much more than now, but they now
argue that Iran does not need nuclear energy? How do the US and her
allies suggest Iran should feed, house and educate her population,
create jobs for her army of educated people, and develop the country,
all with oil and gas alone, while she has very significant uranium
deposits that can be used for generating electricity?
Consider
the case for alternative energy sources from an environmental view
point:
Iran is
beset by huge
environmental problems that have been caused by oil and gas
consumption, problems that are reaching catastrophic scales. Although
Iran established a Department of Environment in 1971, and even though
Article 50 of her current Constitution states that, "In the Islamic
Republic of Iran protection of the environment, in which present and
future generations should enjoy a transcendent social life, is regarded
as a public duty," 8 years of war with Iraq, economic sanctions,
careless (with respect to the environment) development after the War,
and the 120% increase in the population, have kept the goal of cleaning
the environment and maintaining it that way on the back-burner.
However, the environment and its health can no longer be neglected.
Since
1980, carbon
emissions in Iran have risen by 240%, from 33.1 million metric tons
emitted in 1980 to more than 85 million metric tons at present. Note
that, whether we use oil (which causes severe pollution problems) or
gas (which, compared with oil and coal, is considered as a relatively
clean source of energy), carbon emission cannot be avoided. This
emission is one of the main culprits behind air pollution in Tehran and
all other major cities of Iran that has reached catastrophic levels, so
much so that the elementary schools must be closed on many days. Long
term effects of the polluted air are blamed for causing 17,000 deaths
every year in Tehran alone, as well as causing severe problems for
people with asthma, heart, and skin conditions. The cost of medical
care for such illnesses is reaching astronomical levels.
Polluted
air also
severely damages soil and groundwater resources by contaminating the
rain water. At the same time, Iran's industrial base, using oil and gas
for energy, generates wastes that contaminate a large number of rivers
and coastal waters and threaten drinking water supplies. These are
separate from oil spills in the Persian Gulf and pollution in the
Caspian Sea that continue to contaminate the waters. These are all
caused by the fact that, Iran's renewable energy consumption, including
hydropower, solar, wind, tide, and geothermal, account for only 2% of
its total energy consumption, with the rest supplied by oil and gas.
What are,
or can be,
alternative sources of energy for Iran? Surely, given Iran's vast
central desert, solar power can potentially be very useful for
generating electricity and energy. However, this technology is not yet
well-developed. In certain parts of Iran, geothermal sources can also
be used for generating electricity, but Iran has just started exploring
this possibility, and it will take at least 15 years to develop this at
any significant scale. That leaves nuclear reactors, which will not
solve her chronic shortage of electricity, nor will they solve all of
Iran's pollution problems, but they do represent the first important
step in diversifying Iran's sources for energy.
Nuclear
reactors do
have their own problems. One is their management which has to be at a
very high level so that the chances of accidents, similar to those that
happened in Three-Mile Island in the US (in 1979) and in Chernobyl in
Russia (in 1986), will be minimal. In addition, one must deal with
protecting and storing the nuclear wastes produced by the reactors
which would be radioactive for at least tens of thousands of years.
But, these problems are generally believed to be manageable.
In Part
III of this series, the dispute between Iran and the International
Atomic Energy Agency will be described and analyzed.
Original
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Part III: The Emerging Crisis
This
article is the
last of a three-part series on Iran's nuclear program. In this Part,
the dispute - many consider it a crisis - between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is described.
Recall
that after the
February announcement of President Mohammad Khatami regarding the
construction of the facilities in Natanz for uranium enrichment, and
other associated plants needed for this purpose, Dr. Mohammad El
Baradei, the head of IAEA, accompanied by a team of inspectors, visited
Iran. Since then, the IAEA's inspectors and experts have visited Iran
several more times. A preliminary report was published in July, with a
follow-up one on August 26.
Before
the
revelations about the Natanz facility, there had been reports for years
that Iran had sought, albeit unsuccessfully, the uranium enrichment
technology, both in the international market and from the Russian
Ministry of Atomic Energy. Although not definitively established yet,
it now appears that the Natanz facility is similar to what Pakistan had
built for its nuclear program in the 1980s. Various reports indicate,
however, that the Natanz facility is in fact far more sophisticated
than both Pakistan's and what was discovered in Iraq after its defeat
in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
The
process of
converting uranium ore to enriched uranium is actually long and very
complex. It has been known for many years that Iran has natural uranium
reserves, in the form of uranium ore. In 1985, the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) located over 5,000 metric tons of uranium
ore in the desert in eastern part of Yazd province. This represents one
of the largest deposits of uranium ore in the Middle East. The ore must
first undergo a semiprocess to be converted to a powder, usually called
the yellowcake. Iran is building a facility in Ardakan for this
purpose. The yellowcake is then further processed to produce uranium
hexafluoride (UF_6) which is in gaseous state. The facility for doing
this is being built in Esfahan (Isfahan). Uranium has two important
isotopes (that is, two slightly different versions of it with slightly
different atomic masses) which are uranium-235 and uranium-238 (the
numbers represent the atomic masses). It is uranium-238 that may be
used in making nuclear weapons, but also in nuclear reactors. The
Esfahan facility will also produce uranium oxide and uranium metal,
both of which have civilian as well as military applications.
The
Natanz facility
is equipped with the instruments for what is currently considered to be
the standard uranium-enrichment technique, namely, a large number of
centrifuges that spin uranium hexafluoride gas at very high speeds.
Under such conditions, centrifugal forces help separate the lighter
uranium-235 hexafluoride from the heavier uranium-238 hexafluoride. The
facility has a pilot gas centrifuge plant that, by the end of 2003, is
supposed to house 1000 centrifuges (at the time of the IAEA visit in
February, there were 160 centrifuges in the facility), and a
large-scale production plant which will house up to 50,000 centrifuges,
the installation of which (which is supposed to begin in 2005) will
take up to 10 years. Such a facility would then have the capability for
producing enough uranium for annual consumption of a nuclear reactor of
the Bushehr-type. Note that only 10 countries have access to the
centrifuge technology.
Development
of a
uranium-enrichment facility is an important step (but not the only one)
towards making nuclear weapons. For example, the Natanz facility, when
complete and in full operation, could produce 500 kgr/year of
weapon-grade uranium. As it typically takes about 20 kgr of enriched
uranium to make a single nuclear bomb, the produced uranium would be
enough to make about 25 bombs every year. We must, however, keep in
mind that a uranium-enrichment facility is also utilized for peaceful
purposes it can produce low-grade enriched uranium for use in nuclear
reactors.
Since,
typically, one
first tests whether a single centrifuge with a small quantity of
uranium hexafluoride works before installing hundreds (or even
thousands) of them, one might suspect that Iran does have at least a
small amount of enriched uranium, not declared to the IAEA, which, if
true, would imply that Iran is in serious violation of the NPT that it
signed in 1968. However, such tests can also be carried out by computer
simulations and modelling. Recall that even nuclear explosions are
simulated completely realistically, and therefore, in principle, one
does not need a physical test to check whether the centrifuges work.
Whether this is the case in the present situation is not clear.
It was
reported on
July 18 that the IAEA inspectors had detected the trace of enriched
uranium in the samples taken at Natanz, but Iran said that the source
of the trace is the equipments brought to Natanz from elsewhere and
bought on the international market. Subsequently, it was announced on
September 25 that a trace amount of enriched uranium has also been
detected at Kaalaa-ye (Kalaye is usually used in the english press)
Electric Company in the northwest suburb of Tehran, a non-nuclear site
(the Company produces watches, as well as certain components for the
centrifuges) that the IAEA suspects Iran is using for her nuclear
enrichment activities. Since Iran had declared to the IAEA that the
instruments at Natanz had been stored at the Kaalaa-ye Electric site
before being transported to Natanz, and given that no trace of enriched
uranium has been detected anywhere else in Iran, the Kaalaa-ye Electric
discovery may actually confirm Iran's contention regarding the origin
of the enriched uranium. But, once again, the situation is not clear,
unless Iran provides the IAEA a list of suppliers that provided her
with the instruments and equipments.
How are
nuclear
facilities monitored and violations of the NPT discovered? Inspections
of nuclear facilities include the use of a powerful technique, called
the isotopic detection, which, in essence, is a method for monitoring
the environment and anything that might contaminate it. This technique
is based on the facts that, (1) extremely small quantities of a
material always escape a process or an industrial plant, and (2) that
an equipped laboratory can readily identify the isotopic ratio of a
sample that contains extremely small, albeit measureable, amounts of a
material, even if it is as small as a billionth of a gram.
Nuclear
physics
predicts that the ratio of uranium-235 to uranium-238 is essentially
the same everywhere. Therefore, when the isotopic detection technique
is applied to samples containing uranium, those with ratios lower than
the theoretically-predicted value would most probably indicate illegal
(from the NPT stand) uranium-enrichment activity. The same technique
can be used for detecting any amount of plutonium that is in excess of
what is (theoretically) expected, which would then suggest the
existence of a reprocessing program for nuclear wastes generated by
nuclear reactors, from which plutonium is extracted. This technique is
used, under the NPT, in the declared nuclear facilities of the NPT
signatories.
As a
reaction to the
discovery of Iraq's program for developing nuclear weapons, that was
discovered by the United Nations inspectors in 1991 after Iraq's defeat
in the second Gulf war, the IAEA decided to develop and implement
additional procedures for enhancing nuclear safeguards. At the time,
the IAEA hoped to have these additional procedures or protocols in
place two years later, hence the name "93+2" that is sometimes used to
refer to this matter. The Additional Protocol was developed in 1996,
and has since been signed by 78 countries (out of the 183 countries
that have signed the NPT). Thirty three of these countries, mostly
small nations, have also ratified the signing of the additional
protocol by their national parliaments, and hence implementing it,
although these countries cannot really afford to develop nuclear bomb!
Most importantly, the Additional Protocol has not been adopted by the
US, its most forceful advocate when it comes to OTHER countries!
The
Additional
Protocol also gives the IAEA the authority to inspect any facility of
any nation that has signed the Protocol, even those that, seemingly,
have nothing to do with a nuclear program, any time that the IAEA
wishes. This is a problematic aspect of the Additional Protocol, as
inspection of non-nuclear facilities may be interpreted as an
infringement on the national sovereignty of a country under inspection.
However, since Iran's facilities have been under inspections for years,
this should be a minor issue.
On Friday
September
12, 2003, the 35-member governing board of the IAEA gave Iran an
ultimatum until October 31 to prove that her nuclear program is
strictly for peaceful purposes, by providing all the deatils of her
nuclear program. Iran's reaction was mixed: On one hand, she reacted
with indignation, calling the ultimatum "premature" and "unfair," while
stating, on the other hand, that she will continue working with the
IAEA.
It should
be pointed
out that even Ms. Melissa Fleming, the spokeswoman for the IAEA,
conceded that the ultimatum was "highly unusual" in that it was adopted
WITHOUT A VOTE. At the same time, the IAEA itself had conceded that
Iran had expanded her cooperation with the Agency, even allowing many
sites that are not covered by the NPT, such as the Kaalaa-ye Electric
Company, to be inspected. Therefore, the ultimatum has much to do with
Iran's poor international standing and isolation, which are, of course,
justified.
At the
same time, the
US is once again using an important international organization to
advance her agenda, damaging in the process the credibility and
effectiveness of the organization, only a few months after doing the
same to the United Nations during the debate over invasion of Iraq (and
now going back to it asking for help!). France and Germany, at odds
with the US over invasion and occupation of Iraq, but eager to mend
their relations with the US, also have joined her in calling on Iran to
immediately sign the Additional Protocol, and to reveal all of the
details of her nuclear program.
Before
analyzing the present situation between Iran and the IAEA, we must keep
in mind that,
(1)
according to the
original IAEA safeguard agreements, Iran was not obligated to declare
the start of construction of the Natanz facility. These agreements
stipulate that, only 180 days before introducing any nuclear material,
does Iran have to declare the existence of the facility. Therefore,
construction of the undeclared Natanz facility is NOT by itself a
vilation of the NPT.
(2) The
NPT does
allow Iran to legally build any nuclear facility, including one for
uranium enrichment, so long as it is declared to, and safeguarded by,
the IAEA, and is intended for peaceful purposes.
Keeping
these
important points in mind, the problematic aspects of Iran's nuclear
program, so far as the IAEA is concerned, are as follows.
(a) The
origin of the
trace amounts of highly-enriched uranium at Natanz and Kaalaa-ye
Electric Company near Tehran is not yet clear. This was already
described and discussed above.
(b) Iran
declared to
the IAEA that since approximately seven weeks ago, she has begun some
uranium enrichment activities at Natanz using a single centrifuge.
Since this was declared to the IAEA, and because the Natanz facility is
now monitored by the IAEA, this activity does not represent a violation
of the NPT (although, given the current international conditions, some
may regard the timing of this as unfortunate). The important point of
contention is: How can Iran be so sure that the centrifuges at Natanz
work with high levels of reliability, if no prior (undeclared) tests
have been carried out? Iran has countered that she has used modelling
and simulation, mentioned above, which is plausible, but does not, of
course, exclude the possibility of actual physical tests.
(c) The
IAEA has
demanded that Iran provide it with all the details of the work at
Kaalaa-ye Electric Company. Iran has provided some (but presumably not
all) of the details, and has allowed the facility to be visited by the
IAEA inspectors, even though this inspection is not covered by the NPT,
although, at first, Iran refused to grant the IAEA the permission to
visit this site. If Iran does sign the Additional Protocol, then she
would have to completely open the facility to the IAEA inspectors.
(d) As
mentioned in
Part I, in 1991, Iran received from China 1,000 kgr of natural uranium
hexafluoride, 400 kgr of uranium tetrafluoride (UF_4), and 400 kgr of
uranium dioxide (UO_2), without reporting them to the IAEA. The
question then is: What happened to these uranium compounds? Iran has
declared that some of the compounds have been converted to other
uranium compounds, some of which have medical applications, while
others may be of dual use. Given that Iranian medical scientists who
work in Iran have published the results of their research involving
such uranium compounds, Iran's explanation is plausible, but does not
provide an explanation for the fate of all the undecalred uranium
compounds.
In this
author's
opinion, none of these problems is intractable, and so far as their
scientific and technological aspects are concerned, can be addressed to
the satisfaction of the IAEA. The main problem, in this author's
opinion, is that much of the dispute with the IAEA is political, rather
than scientific or technological. To see this, consider the following
indisputable facts:
(1) As
recognized by
the NPT, peaceful use of nuclear technology, and in particular nuclear
energy, is Iran's fundamental right, so long as her nuclear program is
completely transparent to the IAEA.
(2)
Article 22 of the
agreement between Iran and the IAEA allows for an "arbitral tribunal,"
if there is still any dispute after Iran provides sufficients details
of her nuclear program to the IAEA. Therefore, October 31, 2003 is not
necessarily a rigid deadline.
(3) The
United States
has a selective non-proliferation policy. She allows Pakistan, a
country that created the Taliban and her population has provided
sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and his terrorisat group; a country whose
military is still controlled to a large extent by extremist elements,
to develop nuclear weapons. The US has assisted Israel to develop an
impressive arsenal of nuclear weapons; has exported nuclear technology
to China, and has offered a deal to North Korea regarding her nuclear
reactors. The US does not pressure Pakistan, India and Israel to sign
the NPT and its Additional Protocol. A little-known fact is that, in
early 1995, the German government proposed a plan whereby Kraftwerk
Union (a subsidiary of Siemens) would complete construction of the
Bushehr reactors (see Part I of this series), subject to Iran's
agreeing to extra non-proliferation verification procedures similar to
those that the United States negotiated with North Korea, and Iran
agreed with the plan. But, once again, immense pressure by the United
States scuttled the plan, after which Iran turned to Russia for
completion of the Bushehr reactors.
A few
other important points must be mentioned here:
(a) In
this author's
opinion, if acquiring nuclear reactors is in Iran's national interests
(see Part II), so is signing the Additional Protocol. However, it is
completely reasonable to expect that, in return for signing the
Protocol and openning the nation to the IAEA inspections, Iran should
obtain access to advanced nuclear technology, which should, however, be
monitored and safeguarded by the IAEA. The fact remains that Russian
nuclear reactors are inferior to those made in the West. Britain,
France, and Germany have already promised to help Iran.
(b)
However, in this
author's opinion, signing the Additional Protocol, while necessary, may
not be sufficient by itself to protect Iran's nuclear assets since this
author believes that, unless the US invades and occupies Iran and
installs a completely puppet regime in Tehran, she will continue
pressuring Iran, using her nuclear program as a pretext, regardless of
the future political developments in Iran. Thus, Iran's aim, in this
author's opinion, must be addressing the demands of the IAEA with which
the European Union also agrees, and to open up all of her facilities to
inspections.
(c) The
present
Iranian leadership, both elected and unelected, must recognize that it
has been given no mandate to deprive Iran's furure generations of the
most advanced technology, namely, nuclear technology, by acting against
Iran's national interests, including resisting stubbornly the
legitimate demands by the IAEA. While giving Iran, a sovereign nation,
an ultimatum is repugnant, there are many legitimate issues that must
be addressed.
(d) It is
highly
important how Iran responds to the IAEA reasonable demands. She can
react by dragging her feet, without having any active, efficient, and
logical diplomacy, which will eventually result in agreeing to all the
IAEA demands but under highly unfavorable circumstances, hence bringing
about severe set backs to Iran's nuclear program, if nothing else
(which could include economic sanctions and military threat).
Alternatively, Iran can come forward with all the details of her
nuclear program, while being firm in demanding assistance for acquiring
advanced nuclear technology, in which case the EU, Russia, Japan and
the non-aligned countries may help Iran.
(e)
Unless Iran
addresses the issues that the IAEA has raised, and signs the Additional
Protocol on nuclear inspections, she will not only fail in her goal of
building a network of nuclear reactors, but will also be under severe
international pressure. Iran has already felt this pressure: Japan has
slowed down negotiations for development of the Azaadegaan oil field
(the largest field in the Middle East with estimated reserves of 26-30
billion barrels of oil), and the Shell Oil Company has withdrawn from
negotiations for developing the same field. Under severe international
pressure, the task of building a network of nuclear reactors will be
set back for many years, if not decades.
With
Israel's help,
the apartheid regime of South Africa developed extensive nuclear
facilities, and even made 16 nuclear bombs. The sixteen nuclear bombs
could not, however, prevent the demise of the South African racist
regime. While after establishment of a democratic system, the South
Arfican government of President Nelson Mandela gave up volunteerly its
nuclear bombs, the nuclear technology and know-how, developed during
the apartheid regime, now belong to a democratic country and all South
Africans.
Nothing
protects
Iran's national security and interests better than acceptance of her
political system and government by Iranian people, which would happen
only if a truly democratic system is established in Iran. At the same
time, Iran's nuclear infrastructure is part of her national asset,
belonging to all Iranians, regardless of their political inclinations.
It is ultimately up to Iranian people, like their South African
counterparts, to decide the fate of their country's nuclear technology,
once such a democratic system is established.
Original
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Part IV: Economic Analysis of the Program
Introduction
Over the
past two
years, Iran's program for constructing the complete cycle for producing
enriched uranium - the fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear power
plants (NPPs) - has been the subject of intense discussions. Over this
period, the experts and inspectors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) have been visiting Iran on a regular basis to inspect its
nuclear facilities. The information and data that have been collected
by the IAEA on Iran's nuclear energy program have revealed sustained
and determined efforts by Iran since 1985 for developing an advanced
program for producing enriched uranium. The Bush administrtation has
been arguing that the primary purpose of Iran's nuclear program is
developing nuclear weapons. The European Union (EU), which has very
extensive commercial relations with Iran; Russia, which is completing
the construction of a NPP in Bushehr (on the shores of the Persian
Gulf), and Japan, which has signed a lucrative oil agreement with Iran
for developing Iran's giant Azaadegaan oil field, have all pressed Iran
hard, demanding that it reveal all the details of it nuclear program.
The Board
of
Governors (BOG) of the IAEA has had periodic special meetings to review
the progress in assessing Iran's nuclear program. In its latest special
meeting on Iran, which was held on Monday November 29, 2004, the IAEA
reported to the BOG its latest findings on Iran's program, and due to
the agreement that Iran recently signed with the EU troika - Britain,
France, and Germany - for suspending its uranium enrichment program, no
further special meeting of the BOG of the IAEA has been scheduled; that
is, Iran's case before the BOG has gone back to being a normal,
un-urgent case for now.
In a
series of
articles that were posted on Payvand in early October 2003, the author
prsented a brief history of Iran's nuclear program (Part I); described
the general outlines of the arguments that may justify Iran's nuclear
energy program as economically viable (Part II), and explained the
crisis that was emerging at that time in the relationship between Iran
and the IAEA (Part III). This article and Part V continue the
discussions that were begun in the first three parts of the series and
expand on them.
When Part
II of this
series was first posted in October 2003, many colleagues and readers of
the article urged the author to quantify the arguments presented in
that article that were supportive of Iran's nuclear energy program as
an economically viable program. The goal of the present article is just
that: analyzing Iran's program for generating nuclear energy in the
context of its energy needs over the next two decades, and carrying out
an economical analysis to quantify and support the arguments that were
first presented in Part II, using the latest and most accurate
statistics on Iran's energy consumption and production currently
available.
Another
goal of the
present article is to debunk - hopefully for the last time - the
"argument" that the US neo-conservatives have been making, namely, that
given Iran's vast oil and gas reserves, it does not need nuclear
energy. The neo-conservatives and their allies, ranging from Israel to
Iran's anti-democratic forces (from the group that makes new
"discoveries" on Iran's program on a weekly basis to the monarchists),
are the last group that are still hanging onto this argument! The
analysis and arguments presented in Part II (and its short version
published in the International Herald Tribune on October 14, 2003), as
well as those presented by numerous others, have already made their
impact: Iran's nuclear energy program has been transformed from one not
needed by, or suitable for, Iran to a one for which the EU is willing
to GUARANTEE the supply of nuclear fuels, provided that Iran "suspends"
indefinitely its uranium enrichment program!
At the
same time, it
should be pointed out that when, under the US encouragement (some say
pressure), Iran's nuclear energy program was started by the Shah in
1974,
(a)
Iran's population was less than half of the present 70 million;
(b) its
oil
production was about 5.8 million barrels (MB) per day, compared with
the present average daily production of 3.9 MB/day;
(c) it
exported about 5 MB/day of oil, compared with the present average daily
export of 2.6 MB/day;
(d) its
energy consumption was less than one-fourth of the present;
(e) the
Shah's government was burning Iran's natural gas for elimination,
simply because it had no use for it, and,
(f)
unlike now, Iran's oil reservoirs were not in decline, needing
re-pressurization (see below) by natural gas injection.
In short,
Iran did
not need AT THAT TIME to generate electricity using NPPs. This then
begs the question: Why is it that, given its present conditions which
can justify use of NPPs for producing electricity (see below), the
neo-conservatives and their allies believe that Iran does not need
nuclear energy, whereas the US strongly pushed the Shah in the 1970s to
build NPPs when Iran had no need for them (see Part V)?
In Part V
of the
series, the important role that the US and its European allies played
in starting Iran's nuclear program will be discussed in considerable
details. In particular, we will review the history of the US
involvement with Iran's nuclear program to show, based on the newly
accessed documents, that not only the US strongly encouraged the Shah
to buy NPPs from the US, but was also willing to offer Iran, as a
sweetener for the deal, the complete facilities for uranium enrichment
if Iran agrees to buy eight US-manufactured NPPs! This should be
compared with the present state of affairs whereby the US and the EU
are trying to stop Iran from utilizing its uranium enrichment
facilities and offer, instead, to supply Iran the enriched uranium for
its NPPs! In addition, we briefly review the positions of some of the
leading neo-conservatives in the US regarding Iran's nuclear energy
program which reveal the extent to which they are willing to go, in
terms of inflicting on Iran civilian casualties and economic
destruction, to stop it from starting to operate the Bushehr reactor.
In the opinion of the author, giving wide exposure to this position of
the neo-conservatives is particularly important, since Iran's
anti-democratic forces are the neo-conservatives allies.
To begin
the
discussion, we must first decouple Iran's need for nuclear energy from
its perceived or real intentions for producing nuclear weapons, since
constructing NPPs does not necessarily indicate any intention for
making nuclear weapons. Recall that when Iraq's program for making
nuclear weapons was discovered by the IAEA after the Persian Gulf war
of 1990-1991, it did not have a single nuclear reactor; its only
reactor, under construction at Osirak, had been demolished by Israel's
bombing in 1981. The apartheid regime of South Africa produced 16
nuclear bombs in the 1980s, without having a single nuclear reactor!
More
specifically, the goal of the present article is twofold.
(a) We
describe
Iran's energy needs over the next two decades when its population may
reach 100 million, and the resources that it will and must have in
order to secure adequate energy supplies. It is universally recognized
that energy security, which includes securing adequate and DIVERSIFIED
energy resources, is a highly important part of any nation's national
interests which, by their very definition, transcend the political
system that governs a nation. Iran, as a sovereign nation, has a
fundamental right to diversify and develop its energy resources - the
engine for its economic and social development.
(b) Why
Iran must
stop relying on oil and natural gas as its main sources of energy, and
begin developing alternative sources, is discussed next. We show that,
in addition to being in its long-term national interests, there are
compelling economical, environmental and technological reasons for Iran
to seek out alternative sources of energy, instead of relying so
heavily on the fossil fuels. Moreover, we argue that a nuclear energy
program has many other benefits for Iran in terms of the necessary
technology that must be imported into the country, and the educated
class of people that will run Iran's nuclear industry.
Whether
Iran is trying to make nuclear weapons is beyond the scope of this
article and, therefore, will not be discussed.
Iran's
Energy Consumption and Resources
Iran's
population is
currently estimated to be close to 70 million, about 70% of which is
below the age of 30. This should be compared with Iran's population of
30 million when the Shah started Iran's program for building NPPs in
1974. Most estimates indicate that Iran's population may reach 100
million by 2025.
According
to reliable
statistics (provided by not only Iran's Ministry of Power, but also by
International Energy Agency, the British Petroleum Annual Statistics,
etc.), between 1977 and 2003, Iran's rate of energy consumption has on
average increased 5.5% per year, from an equivalent amount of 181 MB to
about 740 MB of crude oil. Moreover, since the end of Iran-Iraq war in
1988, Iran's oil consumption has had an annual growth rate of about 8%,
while the supply of energy from all of its sources has had an annual
growth rate of 6%, hence barely keeping up with energy consumption.
Between 1977 and 2001, the electricity production has been experiencing
an average annual growth rate of 8.5%. Iran currently produces 31,000
megawatt (MW) of electricity. Most importantly, in 1977 Iran consumed
29.6 MB of crude oil to generate electricity, whereas 265 MB of oil
were used in 2003 for the same purpose, representing an average annual
growth rate of 8.8%.
If the
above trend
continues and crude oil is not replaced by another energy source, and
if Iran does not increase its oil production significantly, it may
become a net IMPORTER of oil over the next decade, a huge catastrophe
for a country that obtains 80% of its total export earnings, 45% of its
total annual budget, and about 15% of its GDP from exporting oil. It is
estimated that during 2004 the average price of Iran's crude oil will
be about $30/barrel. It is noteworthy that Iran earns about $900
million/year for every $1/barrel increase in the price of its oil. We
now describe in more details Iran's various energy sources.
Oil
Reserves
Over the
past decade,
major discoveries by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) have
increased Iran's proven and recoverable oil reserves to about 131
billion barrels, up from 93 billion barrels in 1993. This represents
about 11.4% of the world's proven oil reserves, making Iran second only
to Saudi Arabia. During the first six months of 2004, Iran produced
about 4.1 MB/day, up from an average of 3.9 MB/day in 2003. Iran's
SUSTAINABLE oil production is about 4 MB/day. About 70% of Iran's oil
(2.8 MB/day) is produced by 9 giant onshore fields, with the offshore
fields (in the Persian Gulf) producing another 0.675 MB/day (17% of the
total production). Note that Iran was producing about 5.8 MB/day of oil
during the last two years of the Shah in 1977-78, but has never
exceeded, on an average basis, 3.9 MB/day since the Islamic Revolution,
while its population has increased by 130%. Iran's OPEC quota is 3.817
MB/day. Its oil exports average about 2.6 MB/day, mainly to China,
Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
Iran
spends $3
billion/year to subsidize the price of oil products for its domestic
consumption. Another $2-3 billion/year is spent on IMPORTING some oil
products (mainly gasoline). To counter the rising rate of consumption
of gasoline (10.5% per year), Iran has doubled its price over the past
2 years.
Iran
plans to
increase its oil production to 7 MB/day by 2025. This would need about
$60 billion in foreign investment. Since President Khatami was elected
in 1997, Iran has succeeded in attracting about $20 billion in foreign
investment for its oil and gas sectors, with its lion share going to
the natural gas sector (see below). Since Iran's Constitution prohibits
granting of oil rights on a concessionary or direct equity basis,
Iran's main mechanism for granting contracts is the Buy-Back scheme,
whereby the contractor pays for all the investments, receives
compensation from NIOC in the form of an allocated production share,
and transfers the operation of the field to NIOC after a fixed period.
This arrangement has been criticized domestically (mainly for its
guaranteed high rates of return, which is typically 15-18%, and was
over 20% for the first 2-3 contracts), and has not made many foreign
oil companies very happy either, as they may not be allowed to develop
their discovery, let alone operating them. In addition, the short terms
of such contracts (typically 5-7 years) are disliked by oil companies.
As a result, in January 2004, Iran announced major modifications to the
Buy-Back scheme by extending the length of such contracts to as many as
25 years, while allowing for continued involvement of the oil companies
after a field's operation is transferred to NIOC.
Natural
Gas
Iran
possesses about
942 trillion cubic feet (TCF) in proven natural gas reserves - 15.2% of
the world's proven reserves - second only to Russia. Of these, about
62% are in mostly undeveloped non-associated fields (associated gas is
what one finds in oil reservoirs). Iran's major gas fields include the
giant South Pars (with reserves of 280-500 TCF) in the Persian Gulf
which is the largest gas field in the world. This field also contains
over 17 billion barrels of gas condensates (liquids). In addition, many
of Iran's oil fields produce large amounts of (associated) gas. Iran's
natural gas production in 2002 was about 2.7 TCF.
Natural
gas has
increasingly become the main source of energy in Iran. Whereas in 1977
it represented only 8.4% of Iran's energy consumption, it now accounts
for more than 53% and is rapidly increasing. This statistics alone
should debunk the argument of opponents of Iran's nuclear energy
program that it has not tried to use its natural gas a source of energy.
Iran has
given the
highest priority to development of South Pars field, since it shares it
with Qatar. The field is supposed to be developed in 28 phases; 16
phases are currently active. Developing South Pars has attracted over
$15 billion in foreign investments, and has generated at least 30,000
new engineering and supporting technical jobs in Iran. In addition to
natural gas, gas condensate production from the field should reach
about 220,000 barrels/day by 2005, and 630,000 barrels/day by 2015.
When South Pars is fully developed, Iran will earn over $11
billion/year for at least 30 years from this field ALONE.
Between
35% to 40% of
all the produced natural gas is injected into many of Iran's giant but
aging oil fields for pressure maintenance and secondary oil production
(see below). The rest is either exported by pipelines or as liquefied
natural gas, or is consumed domestically. Iran exports natural gas to
Turkey, and has signed agreements, or is negotiating, to sell gas to
Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, India, Pakistan, South Korea,
Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirate. It is also actively seeking to
export gas to Europe through Turkey and Greece (an agreement with
Greece has been signed), hoping to export 300 billion CF/year of gas by
2007.
Iran also
uses its
natural gas as feedstock to develop its petrochemical industry, which
currently produces nearly $2.7 billion in petrochemical products for
domestic consumption and exporting. This generates much added values
for Iran's natural gas, hence justifying its use for a set of projects
for downstream and commodities production, rather than just burning it
as a source of energy. We will come back to this point shortly.
Electric
Power
Currently,
Iran has a
capacity of about 31,000 MW of electricity, of which more than 75% is
generated by natural gas plants, 7% by hydroelectric, and 18% by
oil-fired plants. The corresponding percentages worldwide are,
respectively, 17%, 17% and 8% [1]. Iran currently consumes about 28,000
MW of electricity (the rest of the electrical capacity is exported).
The demand for electric power is growing at an annual rate of 8%. Thus,
Iran projects needing 70,000 MW of electricity by 2021, of which it
plans to produce 7,000 MW by NPPs, representing 10% of its electric
power. Currently, 19% of the world's electricity is generated by NPPs,
and the IAEA estimates that this will reach 27% by 2030 (see below for
further discussions).
Iran does
have large
potential for hydroelectric power generation, estimated to be about
20,000 MW/year. It is currently building 7 hydroelectric power plants,
representing over 63% of its current power generation projects, that
will generate by 2007 over 8020 MW of electricity. By 2021 some 14,000
MW of electricity will be generated by hydroelectric power, projected
to represent 20% of Iran's electrical capacity. In addition, Iran has
some potential for generating electricity from geothermal sources, with
its first geothermal power plant going online recently near Ardabil, in
northwestern Iran. Several small photovoltaic units that generate
electricity are operating in rural areas of Iran.
Nuclear
Energy Program
As
mentioned above,
by 2021 Iran wishes to generate at least 10% of its electricity by
NPPs. However, constructing the NPPs is only part of the plan. Iran
also wishes to possess the full nuclear fuel cycle for producing
enriched uranium, as its has very significant natural uranium reserves
in the form of uranium ore. The main reserves are in Saaghand, 300
miles south of Tehran in the Yazd Province (representing one of the
largest deposits of uranium ore in the Middle East), and near Bandar
Abbas. During 1993-1994, the Beijing Research Institute of Uranium
Geology of China aided Iran with uranium mine exploration and
operation, but Iran appears now to be self-sufficient in the required
expertise.
It is
estimated that
Iran's known uranium ore reserves can produce as much electricity as 43
billion barrels of oil. This is a huge amount by any criterion, but
particularly so if we only recall that if we extract ALL of Iran's
known recoverable oil reserves (a remote possibility!) and use fully
one-third of them only for generating electricity, we will generate as
much electricity as what Iran's presently-known uranium deposits can
produce!
The
uranium ore is
first converted to a powder, usually called the yellowcake. Iran is
building plants in Ardakan and Bandar Abbas for this purpose. The
yellowcake is then further processed to produce gaseous uranium tetra-
and then hexafluoride. The facility for doing so is in Isfahan, which
can also produce uranium oxide and uranium metal, the main components
of nuclear fuel.
The
Natanz facility
is to be equipped with the standard uranium-enrichment instrument,
namely, a large number of cascaded centrifuges that spin uranium
hexafluoride gas at very high speeds and separate the lighter
uranium-235 hexafluoride from the heavier uranium-238 hexafluoride. Of
every 1000 uranium atoms only 7 are uranium-235. It is uranium-235
which is used in nuclear reactors and also nuclear bombs. Hence, one
must have a large number of cascaded centrifuges to produce enough
uranium-235. The Natanz facility has a pilot gas centrifuge plant that
currently houses nearly 1300 centrifuges, and a large-scale production
plant which will house up to 50,000 centrifuges, the installation of
which (to begin in 2005) will take up to 10 years. Such a facility
would then have the capability for producing enough uranium for annual
consumption of a nuclear reactor of the Bushehr-type (producing 1000 MW
of electricity). We note that about 20 countries around the globe are
active in uranium enrichment.
Three
companies,
Kaalaa-ye Electric, Pars Taraash, and Faraayand Technique, can produce
parts for the centrifuges that are to be used for enriching uranium.
Iran also has nuclear waste disposal sites near Qom (Ghom), Karaj, and
Anarak. There are three other nuclear facilities in Iran which
represent research institutions, and are not directly related to
uranium enrichment. It must be emphasized that the IAEA has been
monitoring all of Iran's known nuclear facilities.
The
Case for Nuclear Energy
The main
argument of
the critics of Iran's nuclear energy program is that, it has vast oil
and gas reserves, hence needing no nuclear energy. The argument is
mostly hot rhetoric. Canada and Russia, both major oil exporters, rely
on NPPs for a significant portion of their electricity needs. Russia
has vast oil and gas reserves (its gas reserves represent about a
quarter of the world's known reserves), and Canada exports 1.5 MB of
oil to the US every day, yet they both continue building NPPs. Between
1974, when Iran signed its first agreement for building NPPs, and 2000,
use of NPPs for generating electricity in the world has increased by a
factor of 12! In particular, France is now producing most of its
electricity using NPPs.
At the
same time,
construction of NPPs in Iran is completely consistent with the general
trends in Asia. According to the IAEA [2], 23 of the last 31 NPPs
connected to the world's power grid have been built in Asia. Of the
NPPs currently under construction, 18 of 27 are located in Asia,
generating 78% more electricity by 2015 than 1995. In addition,
according to the IAEA analysis [2], subject to certain reasonable
assumptions, by 2030 27% of the world's electricity will be generated
by NPPs, compared with the current rate of 19%. Even in the US, the
Bush Administration has been talking about a nuclear power renaissance,
and the US nuclear industry has been calling for construction of 50
NPPs by 2020 [3].
However,
aside from
the above general arguments, one can completely justify Iran's nuclear
energy program based on economic, environmental, NUCLEAR EXTERNALITIES,
and Iran's long-term national interests. In what follows we discuss
each of these aspects.
The
Economics of Iran's Nuclear Energy Program
If oil is
to be used
for generating electricity, then, for every 1000 MW of electricity,
Iran must use between 20 to 25 MB of crude oil per year, depending on
the oil quality. This implies that, for an average price of $25/barrel
(currently the oil prce is much higher, and will presumably remain so
for many years to come), Iran will lose $500-625 million/year in oil
exports, which should be compared with the operating cost of about $140
million/year for a NPP generating the same amount of electricity. In
2003 alone, Iran used 265 MB of crude oil to generate 18% of its
electricity. With a 2003 average price of $26/barrel, this represents
$6.89 billion worth of oil exports for A SINGLE YEAR, a staggering
figure that can pay for complete construction of at least two
Bushehr-type (1000 MW) reactors and their operations for several years
at the current prices! When we consider this over the useful life of a
NPP (say, 50 years), not only Iran can replace the oil-generated
electricity with that generated by NPPs, it will save tens of billions
of dollars. Note that constructing NPPs in Iran should, under normal
circumstances, be considerably cheaper than in the US or the EU, as the
labor force is much cheaper in Iran, and many expensive legal and
regulatory aspects of constructing a NPP in the US [4] do not simply
exist in Iran.
Burning
oil to
generate electricity also creates severe environmental problems, as it
has been doing in Iran, with very significant economic consequences
which will be described in the next section.
Now
consider natural
gas power plants. As we already pointed out, Iran has already made
great strides in using natural gas for its energy needs, with 75\% of
its electricity, and 53% of all of its energy consumption being
supplied by natural gas, hence debunking, once again, the main argument
of the neo-conservatives and other opponents of Iran's nuclear energy
program that Iran has not made the necessary effort to use its natural
gas for its energy needs. At the same time, there are other areas of
needs for natural gas that have priorities that may even be higher than
using it for generating electricity, some of which are as follows.
(a) The
author has
been involved in computer modelling of oil and gas reservoirs for over
25 years [5]. A study in 1998 concluded that, out of Iran's 60 oil
fields (at that time), 57 of them needed major technical studies,
repairs, upgrading, and repressurizing by natural gas (the author was a
member of the group that studied this issue and reached the above
conclusion). A typical Iranian oil reservoir is fractured, and is of
carbonate-type with a very tight rock matrix. It is well-known that
injection of huge amounts of natural gas into almost all of Iran's oil
reservoirs is practically the only way of maintaining their pressure to
produce oil (a process called secondary recovery). Water injection,
another common method of pressure maintenance in oil reservoirs, is not
suitable for most of Iran's oil reservoirs [5]. Since, over time, the
pressure will decline, the amount of injected gas must also increase to
keep pace (at some point gas injection alone will not be effective
anymore, and one must start what is usually called the tertiary
recovery process). Currently, 35%-40% of all of Iran's natural gas
production must be injected into its giant but aging oil reservoirs,
without which the production of most, if not all, of them will rapidly
decline.
At the
same time,
consider the following: If the natural gas that one burns annually to
produce 1000 MW of electricity (the amount that the Bushehr reactor
will produce) is injected into a typical Iranian oil reservoir, it will
increase the reservoir's production by at least a few thousand
barrels/day, depending on the reservoir's geology and history of
production. The earning from exporting the extra oil can pay for and
cover part of the operating cost of a 1000 MW reactor ($140
million/year) and reduce its operating cost to a level that makes it
economically competitive with the cost of a gas power plant, estimated
to be $60-70 million/year, while not polluting the environment by
burning oil or natural gas.
We must
also remember
that, (1) the natural gas that is injected into Iran's oil reservoirs
is largely recovered, hence making it even more economical to use NPPs
to produce electricity and use the gas for pressurizing the oil
reservoirs, and (2) NPPs have ZERO emission of carbons and other
pollutants into the air, whereas fossil fuels, including natural gas,
emit large amounts of carbon.
(b) As
pointed out
above, most of Iran's gas fields contain also huge amounts of liquefied
natural gas (LNG). Natural gas can also be easily converted to LNG,
which is sold at a price much higher than that of natural gas itself.
However, the OPEC treats LNG similar to crude oil when determining
quota for its members, and as a member of OPEC Iran cannot exceed its
quota. Therefore, natural gas production cannot be increased
arbitrarily to compensate for the gas that used domestically [6].
(c) As
mentioned
earlier, Iran is already exporting natural gas to several of its
neighbors, and is actively seeking exporting very large amounts of gas
to Europe. This is all part of a new emerging global market - natural
gas - which is going to have [7] great impact on the world economy with
geopolitical implications. By saving as much natural gas as possible
for export, Iran will be in a very strong position in this emerging
market to play a role similar to that of Saudi Arabia in the oil
market, given its gas reserves.
(d) Iran
is
developing its petrochemical industry, for which the main feedstock is
natural gas. The added value generated by producing petrochemical
products (which can be up to 100%, depending on the products) - not to
mention the jobs and industrial base that it creates, and the foreign
currency income that it generates - is much greater than what Iran may
gain by simply burning huge amounts of gas to generate electricity. In
fact, the world's $500 billion petrochemical industry has been
developed precisely for this reason: The added value that one gains
from converting natural gas to downstream petrochemical products which,
in Iran's case which has vast gas reserves and cheap labor force and
energy resources, cannot be ignored.
(e)
Unlike the
popular belief, burning natural gas does contribute to degradation of
the environment - by producing and releasing carbon into the atmosphere
and contributing to the Greenhouse effect and global warming. This will
be further discussed in the next section.
Environmental
Problems Caused by Fossil Energy Usage
"The more
we look to
the future, the more we can expect countries to be considering the
potential benefits that expanding nuclear power has to offer for the
global environment and for economic growth...."
The above
are what
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, said [2] in advance of a
gathering of 500 nuclear power experts in Moscow from 27 June - 2 July,
2004, marking the 50th anniversary of the start of the first NPP. Dr.
ElBaradei points out an important fact: NPPs DO NOT POLLUTE THE
ENVIRONMENT ON A REGULAR BASIS, but that is exactly what oil and other
fossil fuels have been doing to Iran for years. If one is to obtain a
true estimate of the cost of using oil, and even natural gas, as
sources of energy, one must take into account the huge cost of the
medical care for people who suffer from the diseases caused by
pollution of the environment by oil and natural gas, as well as their
damage to Nature. As early as 1990, in a seminar at Gustave E. von
Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies of the University of
California in Los Angeles the author stated that [8],
"Typical
estimates
for the cost of producing electricity and other forms of energy using
oil and gas are only based on their market prices. These prices reflect
only the cost of producing oil (and gas) and of transporting them to
the consumer. However, some of the costs of consuming fossil energy are
not directly included in our energy bill, nor are they paid for by the
producers. These are the HIDDEN, but real, costs that the society pays
indirectly for the health problems caused by air, water and soil
pollution r esulting from using fossil energy, environmental
degradation caused by carbon emission and global warming, and acid
rains. For example, according to the American Lung Association, total
health costs, including lost potential income, of air pollution alone
are estimated to be about $50 billion/year. The main culprit for air
pollution is the fossil fuels, mainly oil, our primary source of
energy. Evaluating the economics of the damage inflicted on Earth by
global warming, caused by carbon emission that is the direct result of
burning oil and natural gas, is currently impossible."
Supplying
energy to
the world releases six billion metric tons of carbon into the
atmosphere every year, with Iran contributing her share. Iran is beset
by huge environmental problems, caused by oil and gas consumption, that
are reaching catastrophic scales. Although Article 50 of Iran's current
Constitution states that, "In the Islamic Republic of Iran protection
of the environment, in which present and future generations should
enjoy a transcendent social life, is regarded as a public duty,"
various reasons kept in the back-burner the goal of cleaning the
environment and maintaining it that way.
Since
1980, carbon
emission in Iran has risen by 240%, from 33.1 million metric tons
emitted in 1980 to more than 85 million metric tons at present. Note
that, whether oil or natural gas is used, carbon emission cannot be
avoided. This emission is one of the main culprits behind air pollution
in Tehran and all other major cities of Iran that has reached
catastrophic levels, so much so that the elementary schools must be
closed on many days. According to Iran's Ministry of Health, and the
Organization for Protection of the Environment, long-term effects of
the polluted air are responsible, directly or indirectly, for causing
17,000 deaths/year in Tehran alone, as well as causing severe problems
for people with asthma, heart, and skin conditions. The cost of medical
care for such illnesses is reaching, by Iran's standards, astronomical
levels. Generating electricity by NPPs does not directly address such
problems, but it does reduce the pollution and environmental
degradation caused by burning oil and (in the long-run) natural gas.
Polluted
air also
severely damages soil and groundwater resources by contaminating the
rain water. At the same time, Iran's industrial base, using fossil
fuels for energy, generates wastes that contaminate a large number of
rivers and coastal waters and threaten drinking water supplies. Iran is
actually reaching the stage which is characterized by chronic shortage
of clean water - believed by many to be the cause of many future wars
in the Middle East.
A recent
study by
John Deutch and Ernest Moniz of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology [9] argued that even in the US, if certain technological
advances are made (expecting to achieve these advances is entirely
reasonable), and subject to a modest tax on the carbon emitted into the
atmosphere, the cost of generating electricity by NPPs will become
competitive with that of gas power plants.
Finally,
strict
environmental regulations and public opposition have prevented
development of significant oil reserves in the US (for example, in
Alaska). At the same time, Western European countries have been
discouraging use of oil and gas, with some moving towards NPPs. Since
1980, France has increased its production of electricity from NPP by
80% and reduced its oil consumption by 10%. But, the same countries
that are reluctant to use oil and gas because they fear damage to their
environment, demand Iran to burn oil and gas to generate electricity!
Nuclear
Externalities
Externalities
are
said to arise when decisions of some economic agents affect the
interests of other economic agents [10]. A good example is provided by
the US space program in the 1960s. Although the program was intended
for (and succeeded in) landing men on the Moon, it also resulted in
tens of thousands of inventions and technological advances that we now
use in our every day lives. What are the externalities of nuclear
technology for Iran? One can list at least four major catagories [11].
Iran's nuclear program will result in,
(a)
development and nurturing of new and unprecedented capabilities for
building technological infrastructures;
(b)
cross-fertilization and diversion of nuclear-related know-how, research
and development, and supply chain to Iran's other industries, and other
branches of science, such as medicine and agriculture;
(c)
added-value and versatility of nuclear technology-related training, and
(d)
creation of new cadre of managers of technology, technocrats, and
organizational system culture.
In the
author's
opinion, nuclear externalities alone justify a nuclear energy program
for Iran. Our contention is perhaps best described by Perkovich who
declared that [12],
"Nuclear
establishments can be seen as avatars of modernity, national prowess,
and power, and the leaders of these establishments are well-positioned
to pursuade (political) leaders and public to give them rein and bring
greatness to their nations."
Iran's
Long-Term National Interests
Iran must
confront
the challenge of its demographic explosion without having access to
many of the necessary tools, which are strong state structures, large
amounts of investment capitals, and industrial infrastructres that are
reasonably advanced. At the same time, oil and natural gas are Iran's
non-renewable national wealth. Once they are burned, they can never be
recovered. One cannot expect Iran to recklessly deplete its
non-renewable national wealth without receiving any lasting benefits in
return, but this will happen if Iran's energy sources are not
diversified, and it continues to rely almost exclusively on oil and
natural gas as almost the only sources of energy.
Since the
1979
Revolution, Iran's population has more than doubled, from 30 to nearly
70 million, while its present oil production is only 70% of the
pre-Revolution level. As pointed out in the Introduction, the question
is: Why is it that the US and its allies believed in the 1970s that
Iran needed NPPs, when its population was less than half of the
present; its oil production was much more than now; its natural gas was
being burned uselessly; its energy consumption was about a quarter of
the present, and when, unlike today, its oil reservoirs were not in
desperate need of natural gas injection, but that, now, Iran does not
need alternative sources, including nuclear energy? How should Iran
feed, house and educate its rapidly growing population, create jobs for
its army of educated people, and develop its infrastructure and
industrial base, mostly based on its income from exporting oil and gas,
but also use the SAME resources to satisfy its ever increasing energy
needs?
The
Challenges of Nuclear Energy
To be
fair, we must also recognize that NPPs do have their own problems:
(a)
Nuclear power
plants require high initial capital cost and investment. However, given
nuclear externalities and other benefits of nuclear energy described
above, the high cost is completely justified in Iran's case.
(b) The
second
problem of NPPs is their safety which must be at a very high level so
that the chances of accidents, similar to those that happened in
Three-Mile Island in the US (in 1979) and in Chernobyl in Ukraine (in
1986), will be minimal. The aforementioned MIT report [9] called for
maintaining the current standards of "less than one serious release of
radioactivity accident for 50 years from all fuel cycle activity,"
which "should be possible with the new light-water reactor plants"
(that is, the reactors that use the heat from nuclear reactions in a
nuclear reactor to generate steam for use in a power plant). The fact
is that the safety of NPPs is a recurring problem. Even J apan, an
advanced industrialized nation, has had many nuclear accidents.
Therefore, the nuclear industry can no longer ignore this problem, or
claim that it has addressed it in a satisfactory manner.
(c) One
must also
address the problem of safely storing the nuclear wastes produced by
NPPs which will be radioactive for at least tens of thousands of years.
Renewable
Energy Sources for Iran?
Iran does
have
potential for generating significant amounts of electricity using
renewable sources (although, in some way, nuclear energy may also be
considered as a renewable source). One is hydroelectric which, as
pointed out above, should provide 20% of Iran's electricity by 2021.
Iran's central desert has the potential to produce some energy using
solar technology, but the technology is not advanced enough to act as a
major supplier, at least not yet or in the near future. There is also
some potential for geothermal energy, but its extent is limited.
Altogether, such alternative methods cannot provide more than 25%
percent of Iran's energy needs, at least over the next two decades.
Conclusion
Iran's
goal of
generating, by 2021, 10% of its electricity by NPPS, 20% by
hydroelectric, 65% by natural gas, and 5% by other sources is rational
and economically justified. The benefits of diversifying Iran's energy
sources, and in particular resorting to nuclear power plants for a
fraction of Iran's needed electricity, far outweight any possible
drawback that it might have, although the author cannot conceive one.
References
[1] The
Role of Renewables in Future Energy Directions, International Energy
Agency report (October 2002).
[2] See
the IAEA
Press Release
[3] See,
Physics Today (April 2002), p. 54.
[4] G.
Rothwell,
Triggering Nuclear Development: What Construction Cost Might Prompt
Orders for New Nuclear Power Plants in Texas, Public Utilities
Fortnightly (May 2004), p. 47.
[5] M.
Sahimi, Flow
and Transport in Porous Media and Fractured Rock, 1st ed. (VCH,
Weinheim, Germany, 1995); 2nd ed. (to be published in 2005).
[6] See
also W.O. Beeman and T.R. Stauffer, Is Iran Building Nukes? An Economic Analysis,
Pacific News Services.
[7] D.
Yergin and M. Stoppard, The Next Prize, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82 (No.
6), 103 (2003).
[8] For
expanded
content of that seminar see, M. Sahimi, How Much do We Pay for a Barrel
of Oil? in, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on
Non-Renewable Energy Sources, Tehran, Iran (December 1993), p. 127,
and, M. Sahimi, Factors Affecting the Development of Fossil Energy
Resources of Developing Countries, in, United States-Third World
Relations in the New World Order, edited by A.P. Grammy and C.K. Bragg
(Nova Science Publishers, New York, 1996), p. 361.
[9] J.M.
Deutch and E. Moniz, The
Future of Nuclear Power; see also, Physics Today (December 2003),
p. 34.
[10] J.
Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications, 2nd ed. (Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffe, 1980).
[11] N.
Meshkati, The
Nuclear Question, paper presented at symposium on, Politics and
Governance in a Changing Iran, Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
Stanford, California (November 31, 2003).
[12] G.
Perkovich,
Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons in India, Pakistan, and Iran, in,
Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Can We Have One
without the Other, edited by P.L. Leventhal, S. Tanzer, and S. Dolley
(Brassey's, Washington, 2002), p. 196.
Original
URL: http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1056.html
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Part
V: From the United States Offering Iran Uranium Enrichment Technology
to Suggestions for Creating Catastrophic Industrial Failure
Introduction
In a
series of articles that were posted on Payvand
in October 2003, the author provided a brief history of Iran's nuclear
program (Part I); described the general outline of the arguments that
justify for Iran nuclear energy as an economically viable source of
energy (Part II), and explained the crisis that was emerging at that
time in the relationship between Iran and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) (Part III). In Part IV, posted on Payvand on
December 7, 2004, the author presented a detailed economical analysis
of Iran's nuclear energy program.
The goal
of the present article is twofold:
(a) We
describe in
detail the key role that the US played in the 1970s in starting Iran's
nuclear program. We show that not only did the US push the Shah to buy
nuclear power plants (NPPs) from the US, but was also willing to offer
Iran the technology for uranium enrichment if Iran agrees to buy eight
US-manufactured NPPs. This should be compared with the present state of
affairs whereby the US and its European allies are pressuring Iran to
refrain from utilizing its uranium enrichment facilities and, instead,
import enriched uranium for its NPP.
(b) We
then compare
what we describe in (a) with the present positions of the US
neoconservatives and their sympathizers, which reveal the extent to
which they are willing to inflict CIVILIAN casualties and economic
damage on Iran to stop it from starting the Bushehr reactor.
Giving
wide public
exposure to the neoconservatives' and their sympathizers' thinking is,
in the author's opinion, particularly important since, as the author
has pointed out in his articles over the past three years, Iran's main
antidemocratic forces - the monarchists and cultists - have aligned
themselves with these groups. Therefore, it is essential to learn more
about the fantasies of the neoconservatives and their sympathizers,
which in turn will help us become more informed about the true face and
colour of their Iranian allies who are willing to do anything to grab
power in Iran.
The
United States-Iran Nuclear Relations in the 1970s
It was
presumably
1955 when the first discussions on developing a nuclear program for
Iran took place. The first concrete step, however, was taken in 1957
when the US signed an agreement with Iran [1] on civilian nuclear
cooperation. This was promoted as part of the US Atoms for Peace
Program that was supposed to provide technical assistance to the
signatories, as well as leasing them enriched uranium, and carrying out
joint research on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the same year,
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), that consisted of Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Britain, and the US moved its Institute of
Nuclear Science from Baghdad to Tehran (after General Abdolkarim
Ghassem's military coup d'etat in 1958, Iraq withdrew from CENTO).
In 1959
the Shah
ordered establishment of a nuclear research center at Tehran
University, Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), and began
negotiating with the US to purchase a 5-megawatt (MW) reactor for the
Center. To this date, the Center remains one of Iran's main nuclear
research organizations.
In the
late 1950s the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to store nuclear bombs in Iran
(presumably due to the victory of the Cuban revolution, the rise of
Fiedel Castro to power, and the support that he began receiving from
the Soviet Union). In February 1961, shortly after President John F.
Kennedy took office, the US State Department opposed the JCOS
suggestion; it was never carried out [2].
In
September 1967
Iran received from the US 5.54 kgr of enriched uranium, of which 5.16
kgr contained fissile uranium isotopes (which could, in principle, be
used in a nuclear bomb), to use in its research reactor at TNRC. In
addition, Iran received 112 kgr of plutonium, 104 kgr of which were
fissile isotopes [3]. The safeguarded 5 MW nuclear research reactor, a
pool-type, water-moderated reactor that was supplied to Iran by the US
firm GA Technologies started full operations at TNRC in November 1967,
using 5.58 kgr of 93% enriched uranium. The fuel was provided by the US
firm United Nuclear Corporation. In addition, the US supplied Iran hot
cells which are [4], "heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated
arms used to chemically separate material irradiated in the research
reactor, possibly including plutonium laden 'targets'." On July 1,
1968, the first day that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was
opened for signature, Iran signed the Treaty. It was ratified by the
Majles (the Iranian parliament) on February 2, 1970.
The
US-Iran
agreement, Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms, that had been
signed in 1957 (see above) was extended on March 13, 1969 for another
10 years. The first announcement on Iran's intention for obtaining NPPs
was made in December 18, 1972 [5], when Iran's Ministry of Water and
Power began a feasibility study for constructing a NPP in southern Iran.
The 1973
war between
the Arab countries and Israel, and the subsequent huge increase in the
price of oil, provided the Shah's government with considerable
resources. In fact, 1974 proved to be a very busy year for Iran's
atomic energy program! The Shah had originally envisioned Iran to
produce, by 1990, 10,000 MW of electricity by NPPs. However, a 1974
study by the Stanford Research Institute concluded that Iran would
need, by 1994, to produce 20,000 MW of electricity by NPPs. Thus, in
March 1974 the Shah announced [6] plans for generating 23,000 MW of
electricity, "as soon as possible," using up to 23 NPPs, with a target
date of 1994. To achieve his goal, the Shah established the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), appointed Dr. Akbar Etemad, a
Swiss-trained physicist, as its first chief, and announced that the
AEOI, like everything else, would be run directly under his command.
The Shah
had proposed
to the US for many years the establishment of a Joint Economic
Commission (JEC) for regulating and expanding Iran's commercial
relations between the two countries. Up until 1974, the US had always
turned down the Shah's suggestion on the ground that, having a
free-market economy, the US government had no role to play in the
commercial relations with Iran. Instead, the Shah had established many
such JECs with the communist countries. However, after the severe
increase in the price of oil during 1973-1974, the US was looking for a
way to recoup billions of dollars that it was spending on importing oil
and, therefore, it suddenly became very interested in establishing a
JEC with Iran! In a SECRET letter, dated April 13, 1974, to Amir
Assadollah Alam, the long-time Imperial Court Minister and confidante
of the Shah, Mr. Richard Helms, the then US ambassador to Iran, wrote
[7]:
"On March
14 and
April 4, 1974 I discussed in audience with His Imperial Majesty my
Government's genuine interest in finding ways to deepen and broaden the
already strong ties between the Imperial Government of Iran and the
United States. I am pleased to describe to you in more comprehensive
detail my Government's views on ways in which we can mutually enrich
the relationships between our Governments. I would Greatly appreciate
this message being forwarded to its High Destination..... Secretary [of
State Henry A.] Kissinger looks forward yo discussing these matters
personally with His Imperial Majesty at a fairly early date...."
Mr. Helms
then went on to suggest the establishment of a JEC, the same commission
that the US had resisted for years (!):
"There is
considerable scope for expanded cooperations between our countries in
the economic field. In order to provide proper focus and suitable
high-level official guidance, we suggest the establishment of a Joint
Economic Commission at the Cabinet level. For our part, we contemplate
that the United States member of the Commission would be the Secretary
of Treasury...."
Mr. Helms
then
proposed the formation of several working groups that "could address
general areas of concern or specific projects," including technology
transfer, petrochemical development, communications, and political and
security matters. But the first and most important working group that
he proposed was the NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTION GROUP, for which he wrote,
"We have
noted the
priority that His Imperial Majesty gives to developing alternative
means of energy production through nuclear power. This is clearly an
area in which we might most usefully begin on a specific program of
cooperation and collaboration. Accordingly, we suggest that this be the
first working group under our Joint Economic Commission. The Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission is prepared at an early date to visit
Tehran with a team of experts to discuss ways and means by which we can
most actively cooperate in this field based on our own experience."
As
pointed out in
detail in Part IV of this series, the fact is that constructing NPPs in
Iran in the 1970s had no economic justification whatsoever. This had
made the Shah very sensitive to the critics' criticism - which had
considerable validity - that nuclear contracts were being imposed on
Iran by the US. Mr. Alam, the Shah's confidante, also expressed his
grave concerns to him by telling him that [8],
"It is
not in the
interest of Shahanshah's Independent National Policy that such
suggestions [Mr. Helm's] be proposed and be called a contract," to
which the Shah responded [8], "We will expand our relations that we
already have, and nothing more,"
just as
Mr. Helms had
suggested to the Shah in their private meeting and mentioned in his
letter to Mr. Alam (see the next paragraph). Even from the US
perspective, although the Shah was its close ally at that time, selling
Iran nuclear technology was also a very sensitive subject, hence the
secret nature of Mr. Helms' letter to Mr. Alam. The sensitivity can be
seen in a paragraph of his letter where, under the title PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENTS, he stated that,
"In the
ordinary
course of events, our joint initiatives in the fields mentioned above
will naturally receive a certain amount of attention. Some general
reference to our expanded cooperation might well take place during
Secretary [of State Henry A.] Kissinger's next visit, but it is my
personal view that we should handle these joint endeavors as natural
outgrowths of the already close and friendly relations between the
Imperial Government of Iran and the United States....."
At the
end of his letter, Mr. Helms emphasized the US eagerness to participate
in Iran's nuclear program:
"The
Secretary [of
State Henry A. Kissinger] has asked me to underline emphatically the
seriousness of our purpose and our desire to move forward vigorously in
appropriate ways...."
In May
1974, Dr. D.L.
Ray, the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, travelled to Iran
during which he mentioned the possibility of establishing REGIONAL
uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities for Iran.
The next
month, the
Shah declared that Iran will have nuclear weapons, "without a doubt and
sooner than one would think" [9]. The Shah first backed off [10], but
later on qualified his earlier statement, saying [11] that Iran has
"no
intention of
acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them, then
Iran might have to reconsider its policy"!
According
to Dr.
Akbar Etemad (the first Chief of the AEOI from 1974 to 1978), the TNRC
carried out experiments in which plutonium was extracted from spent
fuel using chemical agents [12]. Note that the most important use for
plutonium is in a nuclear bomb. It is also believed that the Shah had
assembled at the TNRC a nuclear weapon design team. According to Mr.
Alam [13], in the mid 1970s the Shah ordered the establishment of a
``University of Military Sciences and Technology.'' The mission of this
university, which was supposed to be in Esfahan and controlled solely
by Iran's armed forces, was to carry out research and development in
the area of chemical and nuclear weapons. The Shah had even authorized
stealing the necessary science and technology from other countries, if
need be, in order for Iran to fully acquire the know-how of making
chemical and nuclear weapons. None of these activities did, of course,
provoke any reaction by the US.
On March
3, 1975,
Iran and the US signed an agreement worth about $15 billion, according
to which the US was, among other things, to build EIGHT NPPs in Iran
with a total capacity of about 8,000 MW. The agreement was signed by
the US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and Iran's Finance
Minister Mr. Houshang Ansari. The fuel for the reactors was to be
supplied by the US.
On March
14, 1975, in
National Security Study Memorandum 219 signed by Mr. Henry A.
Kissinger, President Gerald R. Ford directed [14]
"a study
of the
issues involved in reaching an acceptable agreement with the Government
of Iran which would allow nuclear commerce between the countries - -
specifically, the sale of the U.S. nuclear reactors and materials,
Iranian investment in the U.S. enrichment facilities, and other
appropriate nuclear transactions in the future."
About a
month later,
President Ford instructed the US negotiators to offer Iran uranium
enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Specifically, National Security
Decision Memorandum 292, dated April 22, 1975 and signed by Mr.
Kissinger, stated [15] that the US shall
"- -
Permit U.S.
materials to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its own
reactors and for pass-through to third countries with whom we have
Agreement."
In
addition, the US
was willing to allow Iran to invest in the US uranium enrichment
facility (Iran had proposed investing $2.75 billion in an enrichment
facility in the US [16]). This is stated in the Memorandum [15]: The
U.S. shall
"- -
Agree to set the fuel ceiling at a level reflecting the approximate
number of nuclear reactors planned for purchase from the U.S.
suppliers. We would, as a fallbak, be prepared to increase the ceiling
to cover Iran's full nuclear reactor requirement under the proviso that
the fuel represents Iran's entitlement from their proposed investment
in an enrichment facility in the U.S...."
The US
was also willing to allow Iran to reprocess the spent fuels [15] (whic
produce plutonium): The US shall
"Continue
to require U.S. approval for reprocessing of U.S. supplied fuel, while
indicating that the establishment of a multinational reprocessing plant
would be an important factor favoring such approval...."
Around
the same time, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a
contract with Iran for providing training for Iranian nuclear
engineers. At that time, the AEOI had a staff of about 150 nuclear
physicists, about half of whom were from Argentina. The Shah increased
the 1976 budget of Iran's AEOI to $1 billion from about $31 million in
1975.
In
National Security Decision Memorandum 324, dated April 20, 1976 and
signed by General Brent Scowcroft, President Ford authorized the
following negotiation position for the US with Iran. The US side should
[17]:
"Seek a
strong political commitment from Iran to pursue the
multinational/binational reprocessing plant concept, according the U.S.
the opportunity to participate in the project....."
Note that
when President Ford was offering Iran such nuclear concessions, Dick
Cheney, the present Vice President, was the White House Chief of Staff,
and Mr. Donald Rumsfeld was the US Defence Secretary. Therefore, the
same Donald Rumsfeld who was closely involved with pursuing a nuclear
deal with Iran in the 1976, and the same Donald Rumsfeld who went to
Baghdad in December 1983 to inform Saddam Hussein that the US, although
officially neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, was going to tilt towards Iraq
(after which the US provided strong military and intelligence support
to Saddam Hussein), now has a leading role in the invasion of Iraq and
threatening Iran with military strikes.
Around
the same time, Mr. Jeffrey Eerkens, a US uranium enrichment expert,
travelled to Iran to obtain funding for an invention of his for a
special laser that could be used for uranium enrichment. In fact, Mr.
Eerkens obtained in 1978 a license from the US Department of Energy to
sell four lasers to Iran [18]. The lasers were shipped to Iran in
October 1978 (only five months before Islamic Revolution's victory!).
The IAEA reported recently that Iran had experimented with this
technique about 10 years ago. However, apparently, the Eerkens lasers
proved to be unworkable as a uranium enrichment instrument [19].
On April
12, 1977, Iran and the US signed an agreement to exchange nuclear
technology and cooperate in nuclear safety. In an address to the
symposium [20], "The US and Iran, An Increasing Partnership," held in
October 1977, Mr. Sydney Sober, a representative of the US State
Department, declared that the Shah's government was going to purchase
EIGHT nuclear reactors from the US for generating electricity.
During
his now-famous trip to Tehran on January 1, 1978, President Jimmy
Carter and the Shah reached a new bilateral agreement for nuclear
cooperation. The US agreed to grant Iran "most favored nation" status
for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. Iran agreed to buy 6-8
light-water nuclear reactors from the US (subject to approval by the US
Congress).
On July
10, 1978 (only 7 months before the Islamic Revolution's victory) the
draft of the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed. The agreement
was supposed to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy
and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to
Iran's nuclear energy program. Iran was also to receive American
technology and help in searching for uranium deposits [21]. On October
18, 1978, James R. Schlesinger, the US Energy Secretary, sent the
agreement to President Carter for his signature. By then, however,
Islamic Revolution had swept Iran, and the Shah had informed the US
Ambassador Richard Sullivan that his plans for NPPs were on hold.
Finally, in early 1979, the US stopped its supply of highly enriched
uranium to Iran. Since Iran started its nuclear energy program in the
early 1980s, the US has been completely hostile towards it.
The
Neoconservatives' Fantasies for Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Program
We now
move the clock forward for about 30 years to the present times to see
what the neocons and their sympathizers are saying about Iran's nuclear
energy program. We begin with a quote about the neocons [22]:
"The
neocons hate two things: To be wrong and to be ignored."
It is now
an indisputable fact that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons. But, that never stopped the
neocons and their sympathizers from advocating invasion of Iraq, which
ultimately succeeded when the invasion began in March 2003. The
disaster in Iraq has not, however, discouraged the necons and their
sympathizers. They now have fantasies about Iran as if Iranians are not
already suffering enough in the hands of Tehran's right wing. Too many
articles are being published by the necons and their sympathizers
describing their fantasies about Iran. All one has to do is taking a
look at what such publications as the Weekly Standard, the National
Review, the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal, the Times of
London, the Washington Times, and many other publications and websites
contain about Iran, or do a Google search on Messrs Michael Ledeen,
Michael Rubin, Reuel Marc Gerecht, and others. The goal of this part of
the article is not to review what they write about Iran - it will take
books to do so - but only to provide clues to neocons' and their
sympathizers' thinking and their "action plans" for Iran's nuclear
energy facilities, and compare them with the US policy towards Iran's
nuclear program in the 1970s.
Before
doing so, however, the author would like to point out that, having been
a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists for nearly two decades -
an organization dedicated to educating the public about the dangers of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons - he is only too
aware of the danger that such weapons pose against the world, if they
are in the hands of extremists. Therefore, the question is NOT whether
Iran, under its present political conditions, should or should not have
nuclear weapons. Rather, the point of this part of the article is to
give wider public exposure to the neocons' and their sympathizers'
fantasies about Iran, particularly among Iranians. Since they know very
well that Iran is not Iraq to be overrun, and because they were bitten
by "allies" such as Ahmad Chalabi and are well-aware that their Iranian
allies - the monarchists and cultists - have no base of support inside
Iran, they have begun having fantasies!
Exposing
the neocons'
and their sympathizers' fantasies is also important from another
perspective: When it comes to opposing the spread of nuclear weapons
(and it is not even certain yet whether Iran is trying to develop
nuclear weapons), the US has a double standard. Aside from Israel's
arsenal (which includes biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons)
which no US politician dares to question or even officially
acknowledge, the US does not oppose Pakistan's nuclear arsenal - an
immense threat to the stability of that part of the world, because
Pakistan is an essentially failed State in a chaotic state. Its
nuclear-armed military, populated by Islamic extremists, created the
Taliban and still shields many of its leaders. Osama bin Laden could
not have hidden for so long without the support of at least some
elements of Pakistan's military. Pakistan has a sectarian war in which
its majority sunni population has been murdering the shiite minority,
and its schools teach Islamic radicalism. Abdul Ghadeer Khan, the
founder and owner of Pakistan's nuclear supermarket, could not have
operated freely for so long without the support of at least some
elements of Pakistan's military. Even now, Pakistan does not allow any
foreigners, including experts and inspectors of the IAEA, to interview
Mr. Khan. However, instead of trying to alleviate this dangerous
situation, the US has granted Pakistan "special friend" status.
But, the
US double
standards do not end with Israel and Pakistan. The US has exported
nuclear technology to China; has offered a non-aggresion pact and
economic incentives to North Korea, and never objected to Argentine and
South Africa (which developed 16 nuclear bombs in the 1980s) acquiring
nuclear technology and know-how. It was recently announced that South
Korea and Taiwan both have been involved with enriching uranium,
producing plutonium, and even nuclear bomb making, yet the revelation
did not provoke any reaction by the US. Brazil, a signatory to the NPT,
had until very recently refused to allow the IAEA full inspection of
its uranium enrichment facilities that are under construction, yet,
although Brazil provided nuclear materials to Saddam Hussein's regime
in the 1980s, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell declared on October 5,
2004, that Brazil's behavior "does not concern the US."
Here, we
review the
positions of two pundits regarding Iran's nuclear energy program. They
are not at the American Enterprise Institute, the hotbed of
neoconservatism, and may not consider themselves as neoconservative
pundits. However, as we show below, their positions resonate nicely
with those of the neocons.
The first
pundit whose
"positions" regarding Iran's nuclear energy facilities we would like to
discuss is Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, a senior fellow at The Washington
Institute. In a recent book chapter [23] entitled, "The Challenges of
U.S. Preventive Military Action," Mr. Eisenstadt suggested the
following covert actions, among others, against Iran's nuclear
facilities (see pages 121 and 122 of Ref. [23]) (the emphasis with
capital letters is mine):
"harassment
or MURDER of key Iranian SCIENTISTS or technicians;"
"introduction
of FATAL
DESIGN FLAWS into critical reactor, centrifuge, or weapons components
during their production, to ensure CATASTROPHIC FAILURE DURING USE;"
"introduction
of
destructive viruses into Iranian computer systems controlling the
production of components or the operation of facilities;"
"damage
or destruction of critical facilities through SABOTAGE..."
There are
at least three important aspects of the above covert options to
consider:
(a) One
wonders whether
Mr. Eisenstadt's suggestion for murdering Iranian scientists or
technicians is not tantamount to state-sponsored terrorism. If so, it
appears that in Mr. Eisenstadt's view terrorism is committed only by
weaker countries or groups against powerful nations!
(b)
Likewise, it appears
that Mr. Eisenstadt does not consider sabotage as either
state-sponsored terrorism, or against international laws. It appears
that in his view, international laws are good only so long as they
advance the interests of powerful nations!
(c) It is
completely
clear that Mr. Eisenstadt has no notion of what constitutes a
catastrophic failure in an industrial complex. We are talking about a
system which includes nuclear reactors and nuclear materials. Any
catastrophic accident or system failure in any large-scale industrial
complex, let alone a nuclear complex, is one that has immense
consequences in terms of loss of lives, long-term health problems,
human suffering, and economic and environmental damage. We only need to
recall what happened in Bhopal, India - a non-nuclear accident - and in
Chernobyl, Ukraine - a nuclear accident - to see the consequences of a
catastrophic industrial failure. The people of those areas are still
paying with their lives the cost of those accidents, with Chernobyl's
total casualty reaching over 30,000.
To
further boost his case for the type of covert actions he was proposing,
Mr. Eisenstadt stated that [23],
"it might
not be
possible for Iranian authorities to determine, for instance, whether
the death of a scientist was due to natural or un-natural causes, or
whether damage to a critical facility was due to an industrial accident
or sabotage."
Consider
the reasoning:
Mr. Eisenstadt seems to be of the opinion that the people who run
Iran's nuclear program know nothing about anything. He appears to have
forgotten that the same Iranian authorities managed to set up the
complete cycle for enriching uranium over a period of 18 years and hide
it from the world.
It came
to the author's
attention that Mr. Eisenstadt, in an e-mail that he sent to the
panelists of the panel, "Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Program:
Technical Capabilities and Intent," which was part of a workshop
entitled, "Iran's Nuclear Program" (held on Tuesday November 9, 2004,
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington,
D.C.), tried to put a spin on what he had stated in his article quoted
above. In that panel Mr. Eisenstadt's proposal for creating a
catastrophic failure was questioned and criticized by Professor
Najmedin Meshkati of the University of Southern California, an
internationally-recognized authority on safety of nuclear reactors. In
response to Professor Meshkati's criticism, Mr. Eisenstadt stated the
following [24] in his e-mail:
"Had I
been there [in
the panel] I would have pointed out that the term 'catastrophic
failure' is used in industry to describe 'failure, often sudden and
without warning, that jeopardizes the acceptable performance of an
entire system or assembly.' (This definition is from the
ChemIndustry.com website, which describes itself as the worldwide
search engine of the chemical industry). "Catastrophic" refers to how
the failure affects the operation of the system, not its impact on the
people operating the facility or living in its vicinity. There are no
doubt ways to sabotage a nuclear power plant (if one were inclined to
do so and had appropriate access) to prevent reactor start-up or to
force it to shut-down without creating a hazard to the work force or
the peoples of the region."
The
author has been
involved with the chemical and petroleum industry for thirty years. In
addition to being a professor of chemical engineering, carrying out
research (funded by leading funding agencies in the US) and publishing
extensively (over 220 papers and 4 books) in these areas, the author
has also been, and currently is, a consultant to many industrial
coorporations. Mr. Eisenstadt's "clarification" is, in the author's
opinion, nothing but hair spiting and distorting what is widely known,
and does nothing but adding insult to the injury of his original
suggestions. The suggestion that one can cause catastrophic failure in
a nuclear facility "without creating a hazard to the work force or to
the peoples of the region" is absolutely outrageous.
Perhaps
one of the best
responses to the "clarification" of Mr. Eisenstadt, and his claim that
he was only discussing some possibilities, was given by Dr. Guive
Mirfendereski, an international laws expert and a frequent commentator
on Iran and the Middle East. In an e-mail to Mr. Eisenstadt, Dr.
Mirfendereski wrote [25]:
"You are
not in a
scientific conference where all manner of theories are proposed, or in
a sci-fi convention. Since the conditions of flawlessness of execution
are never met, a catastrophic failure will produce catastrophic
consequences. To even suggest such a thing in theory is reckless and
without regard to the human toll that it will engender. Assume that the
catastrophic failure occurs in Bushehr and before you know it the
Iranians [who work there] fail to manage the failure properly - the
Bhopal or Chernobyl style cloud or waterborne contamination then begins
to waft over into the Persian Gulf and the neighboring countries, which
include Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq, where we [the US] have troops
and will have for a foreseeable future. Will you then stand up and say,
oops we goofed, the intel was faulty? Instead of coming up with
Agent-Orange type solution inspired by an over-exaggerated sense of
Bond-esque machismo, maybe the time has come for you and your cohorts
to talk about befriending a country without whose friendship in the
past twenty-odd years we [the US] have managed to screw up everything
we touched in the Middle East - ironically to the ultimate detriment of
the welfare of the citizens of a certain country that wags our [the
US'] national policy."
The depth
of Mr.
Eisenstadt's lack of understanding of what is happening in the Middle
East and what his proposals might do to that region can be seen where
he states in his article that [23]:
"Successful
U.S.
prevention would require exceptionally complete intelligence; near
flawless military execution; and deft post-strike diplomacy to mitigate
an anti-American nationalist backlash, deter retaliation, and, most
importantly, ensure that military action does not poison pro-American
sentiment or derail the movement for political change in Iran. The
complex, daunting, and somewhat contradictory nature of these
challenges (e.g., successful prevention could harm short-term prospects
for political change and complicate long-term prospects for
rapprochement with a new Iran) only underscores the importance of
exhausting diplomatic options before giving serious consideration to
military action."
In other
words, Mr.
Eisenstadt believes that the US can cause a catastrophic failure in
Iran's nuclear energy facilities, with unforeseen human, economic, and
environmental consequences, but if the US only has "deft post-strike
diplomacy" it can prevent a backlash and piosoning of pro-American
sentiment, or derailment of the movement for political change in Iran.
What Mr. Eisenstadt is saying is, in fact, rehashing of what all the
neocons have been saying: That the reason for the anti-US feelings in
the Middle East is just bad public relations, and has nothing to do
with what the US has actually been doing there. In other words, as a
Bush Administration official recently stated, the US should "create
reality" as it goes ahead with its policies in the Middle East.
The
second pundit whose
position regarding Iran's nuclear energy facilities we discuss is Mr.
Patrick Clawson. He is deputy director of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, a pro-Israel think tank. Similar to Mr. Eisenstadt,
Mr. Clawson has been advocating sabotage, and creating industrial
accidents in Iran's nuclear energy facilities. In a recent article Mr.
Clawson stated that [26]:
"In an
ideal world, the
United States could disrupt Iran's nuclear program through covert
means, such as corrupting software programs."
In
another recent article [27] Mr. Clawson was quoted as going further,
stating that:
"The idea
that the only
contingency plan available is to use U.S. air raids is not true. Given
the shoddy design of the Russian nuclear plants whose blueprints Iran
is using for its facilities, one could well imagine that there could be
catastrophic industrial accidents."
However,
it was in the
Workshop in Washington (mentioned above) that Mr. Clawson stated his
position most "eloquently." His remarks followed up Mr. Henry
Sokolski's response to Professor Najmedin Meshkati's inquiry about
suggestion for sabotaging Iran's nuclear system and Mr. Eisenstadt's
written statements quoted above. The following remarks were transcribed
verbatim from the C-SPAN live and then re-broadcast of the Workshop on
Iran's Nuclear Program. Mr. Clawson said (the emphasis with capital
letters are the author's) [28]:
"Look, if
we could find
a way in which we could introduce computer viruses which caused the
complete shutdown of the Bushehr system before it became operational,
that would be DELIGHTFUL."
"If we
could find ways
in which these very complicated centrifuges, which are spinning at such
high speeds, could develop stability problems and fly apart, and the
cascade [of the centrifuges] could be DESTROYED, I think that would be
DELIGHTFUL."
The
readers surely note
that empty centrifuges do not spin! They only spin at high speeds when
they contain uranium hexafluoride which is in gaseous state. So,
destroying the cascade of the centrifuges only implies rapidly
spreading the uranium compound everywhere, from which Mr. Clawson would
derive delight. He continued:
"And,
indeed, if we
could find a way to create an industrial accident of the scale of the
Three Mile Island which did not cause a single fatality, which would
prevent Bushehr from becoming operational, I think that would also be
very HELPFUL."
So, the
contention is
that a nuclear accident of the type and scale of the Three Mile Island
would not cause any fatality! Clearly, Mr. Clawson has not done his
homework. The author invites Mr. Clawson and the interested readers to
watch the award-winning video, "Three Mile Island Revisited" [29]. To
quote, the video
"directly
challenges the
claim of the nuclear industry and government that 'no one died' from
the core meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979,
America's worst nuclear disaster. Through the testimony of area
residents and scientific experts, the documentary presents compelling
evidence that cancer deaths and birth defects increased in the area
surrounding the Pennsylvania plant."
The
author also suggests
that Mr. Clawson and the interested readers read, "People Died at Three
Mile Island," chapter 14 of a seminal book [30] to learn about the
chilling facts about this nuclear accident, from birth defects and
increased rate of child mortality, to increased cancer deaths in that
area.
Mr.
Clawson then continued,
"So,
there are a whole
variety of mechanisms that could be used to stop Iran's nuclear
program, that would be much less dangerous than some of the other
methods that we are talking about. We are talking about military
strikes. I hate to tell you this, but military strikes kill people, and
that fact we have to take into consideration."
So, Mr.
Clawson was
apparently worried about loss of human lives as a result of military
strikes. But he immediately revealed his true colour (if he already had
not by making the statement about a Three Mile Island-type of
accident):
"If we
could find ways
to bring about industrial accidents, that offer good prospects of not
endangering human life, but may UNFORTUNATELY CAUSE SOME COLLATERAL
DAMAGE, then that's a plan that we have to consider."
Therefore,
Mr. Clawson
immediately contradicted himself and conceded that industrial accidents
of the type he is talking about do cause some (how much?) collateral
damage.
After the
1995 agreement
was signed by Iran and Russia for completing the Bushehr reactor, the
Clinton administration began charging that the plutonium that one can
extract from the nuclear waste that the reactor would produce could be
used by Iran for making nuclear weapons. However, this issue was
addressed by Iran and Russia, when they negotiated an agreement by
which the nuclear wastes from the Bushehr reactor would be returned to
Russia. In fact, the Bushehr reactor, at which most of Messrs
Eisenstadt and Clawson fury and covert plans are aimed, is believed by
many experts to be incapable of producing plutonium suitable for making
a nuclear bomb. For example, according to Thomas Stauffer [31],
"The
reactor at Bushehr
is the wrong kind of nuclear reactor for producing weapons-grade
fissile material. It will produce the wrong kind of plutonium.... It
can be operated only in the wrong way with regard to yielding
plutonium, and it is the wrong kind of reactor as well, in the sense
that a facility such as Iran's is easily amenable to close
surveillance, not lending itself at all to any covert diversion - of
even the wrong kind of plutonium."
However,
the neocons and
their sympathizers would have none of these. The only thing that would
satisfy this group is the complete destruction of Iran's nuclear energy
facility, regardless of its human, environmental and economic
consequences. Thus, having "successfully" completed their "Project for
the New Iraqi Century," the neocons and their sympathizers have begun
having fantasies about Iran. We already have neocons among Iran's right
wing in Tehran who have been trying to suppress Iran's democratic
movement. We should look forward to seeing Iranian neo-monarchists and
neo-cultists as well, the US neocons' natural allies.
Conclusion
It is
clear that the Frankstein that the US now calls Iran's nuclear program
was conceived by the Shah and his government, with the direct
assistance and strong encouragement (many believe pressure) by the US.
Not only did the US want the Shah to develop nuclear infrastructure and
build nuclear reactors (hence inspiring him to start the work for
building nuclear bombs), but also offered him uranium enrichment
technology, the main point of contention between the US and its
European allies, and Iran. That was, of course, because the Shah was
the US' dictator, having put him in power after he had been run out of
Iran in 1953. The present reactionary right wing in Tehran is home
grown. That appears to be the main difference between the Shah and his
regime and Tehran's present right wingers.
Nearly 27
years ago,
when the author moved to the US for his graduate studies at the
University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, the neocons and pundits such as
Messrs Clawson and Eisenstadt were considered as belonging to fringe
groups on the far right. Today, such groups are gradually becoming the
"mainstream" of the American politics. With the neocons being in power
for the next four years, we may have to develop new meanings for
"fringe groups," "far right," etc. In that case, the author shudders at
the thought of what the new "fringe groups" or the "far right" may
constitute, if the lunatic neocons represent the "mainstream."
References:
[1] US
Department of State, "Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran," Department
of State Bulletin 36 (April 15, 1957).
[2] G.A.
Morgan, "The
Current Internal Political Situation in Iran," in Digital National
Security Archive, secret internal paper dated February 11, 1961. http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com
[3]
Digital National Security Archive, January 29, 1980, "US Supplied
Nuclear Material to Iran." http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com
[4] D.
Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.
51, No. 1 (January 1995).
[5]
"Nuclear Plant Study Started," Kayhan International (December 19,
1972).
[6]
Tehran Magazine (March 18, 1974), page 2.
[7] A.A.
Alam, "Alam's
Diaries", Volume 4, edited by A. Alikhani (Maziar Press, Tehran, 2001),
pp. 54-58. Mr. Alam had left a copy of the letter with his diaries,
which is reprinted in the book. These documents may also be found in,
"Issues and Talking Points: Intensified Bilateral Cooperation,"
Department of State Briefing in Digital National Security Archive;
nsarchive.chadwyck.com
[8] A.A.
Alam, "Alam's Diaries", Volume 4, edited by A. Alikhani (Maziar Press,
Tehran, 2001), page 7.
[9] "More
Fingers on Nuclear Trigger?" Christian Science Monitor (June 25, 1974).
[10]
According to Ref. [9], Iran's embassy in France issued a statement,
denying that the Shah made that statement.
[11] Der
Spiegel, February 8, 1975.
[12] A.
Etemad, "Iran,"
in, "European Non-Proliferation Policy," edited by H. Mueller (Oxford
University Press, London, 1987), page 9.
[13] A.A.
Alam, "Alam's Diaries", Volume 1, edited by A. Alikhani (Maziar Press,
Tehran, 2001), page 107.
[14] See
President Gerald R. Ford's Presidential Documents at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdmnssm.htm
[15] See
President Gerald R. Ford's Presidential Documents at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdmnssm.htm
[16]
Department of State
Secret Report, "Current Foreign Relations: US-Iran Commission cements
bilateral ties; Iran and Iraq agree to settle differences." See, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
[17] See
President Gerald R. Ford's Presidential Documents at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nsdmnssm/nsdmnssm.htm
[18] L.S.
Spector, "Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987"
(Ballinger Publishing, Cambridge, 1987), page 46.
[19] L.S.
Spector and
J.R. Smith, "Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
1989-1990" (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990), page 205.
[20] A.
Etemad and N.
Meshkati, "The US-Iran Nuclear Dispute: Dr Mohamed ElBaradei's Mission
Possible to Iran," Iran News (July 13, 2003).
[21]
Department of State Memorandum, "Iran: The US-Iran Nuclear Energy
Agreement," October 20, 1978.
[22] This
beautiful and
insightful quote is not the author's. He read it in an article but,
unfortunately, could not locate its original source. The author would
be grateful to any reader who can provide him with the original source
of the quote.
[23]
"Checking Iran's
Nuclear Ambitions," edited by H. Sokolski and P. Clawson (Carlisle, PA,
U.S. Army War College, 2004). The document can be accessed on-line at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/00359.pdf.
Those readers who may feel depressed after reading Mr. Eisenstadt's
chapter in this book, may consider reading the chapter by Mr. Rob
Sobhani for some relief and entertainment. (That chapter is, however,
the subject of a forthcoming article by the author.)
[24] The
author is grateful to Professor Najm Meshkati for sharing with him the
e-mail on December 6, 2004.
[25] The
author is grateful to Dr. Guive Mirfendereski for granting him
permission, on December 6, 2004, to quote him here.
[26] P.
Clawson, "How to Rein in Iran Without Bombing It," the Los Angeles
Times (Friday October 15, 2004).
[27] S.
Efron, "U.S. Options Few in Feud With Iran," the Los Angeles Times
(Monday December 13, 2004).
[28] The
author is grateful to Professor Najm Meshkati for his invaluable help
with transcribing what Mr. Clawson stated.
[29] The
video was produced by Steve Jambeck and Karl Grossman, and is about 30
minutes long.
[30] H.
Wasserman and N.
Solomon (with R. Alvarez and E. Walters), "Killing Our Own, the
Disaster of America's Experience with Atomic Radiation" (Dell
Publishing Co., New York, 1982).
[31] T.R.
Stauffer,
"Unlike Dimona, Iran's Bushehr Reactor Not Useful for Weapons-Grade
Plutonium," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (September 2003),
p. 28; see, http://www.washington-report.org/archives/sept03/0309028.html.
Original
URL: http://www.payvand.com/news/04/dec/1186.html
back
to top
Part VI: The European Union's Proposal, Iran's
Defiance, and the Emerging Crisis
Introduction
Since
February 2003
Iran's program for constructing the complete cycle for producing
enriched uranium - the fuel for nuclear reactors and nuclear power
plants (NPPs) - has been the subject of intense international debates.
Over this period, the experts and inspectors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been visiting Iran on a regular basis
to inspect its nuclear facilities. The information and data that have
been collected by the IAEA have revealed sustained and determined
efforts by Iran since 1985 for constructing the complete cycle for
producing enriched uranium. The Bush administrtation has been arguing
that the primary purpose of Iran's nuclear program is developing
nuclear weapons. The European Union (EU), which has very extensive
commercial relations with Iran; Russia, which is completing the
construction of a NPP in Bushehr (on the shores of the Persian Gulf),
and Japan, which has signed a lucrative oil agreement with Iran for
developing Iran's giant Azaadegaan oil field, have all pressed Iran
hard, demanding that it reveal all the details of its nuclear program.
In a
series of articles
that were posted on Payvand.com in October 2003, the author provided a
brief history of Iran's nuclear program (Part I); described in broad
terms the reasons that justify Iran's nuclear energy program as
economically, politically, and environmentally viable (Part II), and
explained the crisis that was emerging at that time (October 2003) in
the relationship between Iran and the IAEA (Part III). In Part IV,
posted on Payvand.com on December 7, 2004, the author presented a
detailed economical, political, and environmental analysis of Iran's
nuclear energy program, using the most reliable statistics on Iran's
current energy consumption and resources. Part V, posted on December
22, 2004, described in detail the key role that the United States (US)
played from the 1950s to the 1970s in starting Iran's nuclear program.
We showed that not only did the US push the Shah to buy its NPPs, but
also offered Iran the technology for uranium enrichment and
reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel if Iran agreed to buy eight
US-manufactured NPPs, assertions that were repeated later on in an
article published in the Washington Post [1]. We also compared the
history of the US involvement with Iran's nuclear program with the
current thinking of the neo-conservatives and their sympathizers on how
to prevent the Bushehr reactor from operating, a reactor that, under no
conceivable circumstances, can be used for making a nuclear bomb [2].
A major
goal of the
series has been to debunk the "argument" that the US neo-conservatives
and their allies have been making, namely, that given Iran's vast oil
and gas reserves, it does not need nuclear energy. The
neo-conservatives and their allies, ranging from Israel to Iran's
anti-democratic groups (from the terrorist cultist group to the
monarchists) and quasi-democratic groups (those whose words wish
seemingly nothing for Iran but a secular democratic republic, but whose
deeds indicate otherwise [3]) are the only groups that are still
hanging onto this absurd argument [4]. The analysis presented in Parts
II and IV of this series (and their short versions published elsewhere
[5,6]) have made their impact: Iran's nuclear energy program has been
transformed from one perceived not to be needed by, or suitable for,
Iran to one for which the EU is willing to GUARANTEE the supply of
nuclear fuels and advanced nuclear technology (see below), provided
that Iran gives up its right for having the complete cycle for
producing enriched uranium.
Another
goal of this
series has been to inform the public, especially the Iranians who live
outside Iran, about the benefits and perils of the nuclear energy
program that the present Iranian government is pursuing. At the same
time, giving wide public exposure to the neoconservatives' thinking
about Iran is particularly important.
The Board
of Governors
(BOG) of the IAEA has had periodic special meetings to review the
progress in assessing Iran's nuclear program. In its special meeting
held on Monday November 29, 2004, the IAEA reported to the BOG its
latest findings on Iran's program, and due to the Paris agreement that
Iran had signed with the EU troika - Britain, France, and Germany - for
suspending its uranium enrichment program, no further special meeting
of the BOG of the IAEA was supposed to be scheduled; that is, Iran's
case before the BOG was supposed to have gone back to being a normal,
un-urgent case.
However,
as usual,
recent developments have taken unexpected turns, as a result of which
Iran's case before the BOG of the IAEA has, once again, become special.
The reason for the latest twist in this saga is that, in mid August,
after Iran rejected the long-awaited proposal by the EU troika for
curtailment of its uranium enrichment activity in return for economic
and political concessions (see below), it restarted the Esfahan
facility for converting uranium yellow cake to uranium tetra- and
hexafluoride - gaseous compounds (at elevated temperatures) that are
used to produce enriched uranium. However, Iran relaunched the process
after informing the IAEA which is now monitoring the Esfahan facility.
The relaunch of the Esfahan facility was against the Paris agreement
according to which Iran was obligated not to start any part of the
complete cycle for producing enriched uranium, so long as it was
negotiating with the EU troika.
It must
be emphasized
that producing uranium tetra- and hexafluoride is NOT considered by the
IAEA as part of the uranium enrichment process. But, in the highly
politicized and polarized environment that exists between Iran, the EU
troika, and the US (which has worsened since the election of Mr.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's new President), even a process as
harmless, by itself, as producing uranium compounds causes much
tension. We must also realize that the production of tetra- and
hexafluoride in Esfahan is apparently still beset by technical
problems. Various reports indicate that the uranium compounds produced
there are not suitable for enrichment (see below).
In
response to Iran's
action, the EU troika has angrily suspended its negotiations with Iran,
taking the case back before the BOG of the IAEA, and threatening Iran
with a referral to the United Nations Security Council. We must,
however, realize that the only valid basis for referring Iran to the
Security Council is its breach of the nuclear non-proliferation regime
as described in the NPT. However, the IAEA has yet to find any evidence
that Iran was or is engaged in a nuclear weapons program. In fact, the
IAEA just announced that its tests vindicated Iran's claims that traces
of highly enriched uranium found two years ago at Iran's nuclear
facilities are from the equipment imported from Pakistani (see below).
The goal
of the present part of the series is twofold:
(1) We
describe the
developments that have led to the present state of affairs between Iran
and the EU troika. In the author's opinion, much has been made of the
proposal that the EU troika has submitted to Iran, whereas a careful
reading of the proposal reveals that while Iran is being asked to give
up some of its fundamental rights under the NPT agreement, when it
comes to the most important part of an overall agreement between the EU
troika and Iran, namely, the security aspects, the EU proposal falls
severely short; it does not offer Iran any concrete security
guarantees. At the same time, there has been little discussion of what
the author considers a reasonable proposal that Iran made last March to
its EU counterparts regarding its nuclear fuel cycle, which was,
however, ignored completely by the EU troika and the US.
(2) We
then discuss
whether it is in Iran's national interest to start its full nuclear
fuel cycle without reaching a formal agreement with the EU troika and,
through them, the US.
Fall
2003: Iran's Weak Position and the Sa'd Abaad Agreement
On
October 21, 2003, Iran signed the Sa'd Abaad agreement with the
European troika. According to this agreement,
"The
Iranian authorities
reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defence
doctrine and that its nuclear programme and activities have been
exclusively in the peaceful domain. They reiterated Iran's commitment
to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and informed the ministers
that:
a. The
Iranian
Government has decided to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to
address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and
outstanding issues of the Agency and clarify and correct any possible
failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.
b. To
promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for
co-operation in the nuclear field:
i. having
received the
necessary clarifications, the Iranian Government has decided to sign
the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures. As a
confirmation of its good intentions the Iranian Government will
continue to co-operate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol
in advance of its ratification.
ii. while
Iran has a
right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all
uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the
IAEA..."
These
were important PRACTICAL concessions made by Iran. What did Iran gain
in return? According to the agreement,
"The
Foreign Ministers
of Britain, France and Germany welcomed the decisions of the Iranian
Government and informed the Iranian authorities that:
Their
governments
recognise the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in
accordance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
a. In
their view the
Additional Protocol is in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty,
national dignity or national security of its State Parties...."
which are
nothing but
stating the rights that Iran already enjoyed under the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, in essence, Iran gained
nothing practical by signing the Sa'd Abaad Agreement, except
postponing a serious confrontation with the West. The question then is,
why was Iran willing to sign such an agreement which was clearly
indicative of its weak position (at that time)? Several factors
contributed to Iran's decision to sign the Sa'd Abaad Agreement, some
of which are as follows.
(1) Iran
had not told
the world about its nuclear energy program for 18 years. Although in
terms of Iran's legal obligations towards the NPT, hidding the nuclear
facilities was NOT illegal [7], the fact is that the world was
suspicious of Iran. At the same time, even if Iran was, or still is,
trying to make a nuclear bomb (and this is still unclear), most experts
agree that it is still years away from achieving this goal [8], simply
because Iran does not appear to have solved all the technical problems
regarding the enrichment process (see below). Therefore, temporary
transparency and openness could help Iran learn more about the process.
(2) In
October 2003 the
US and Britain had appeared to be the absolute victors in Iraq. Saddam
Hussein's regime had been overthrown swiftly, and there was not yet any
strong indication that the Sunnies, together with foreign terrorists,
would fight back and create the mess that Iraq is today. President Bush
had already declared "the end of major combat operations," and had
boasted about "mission accomplished." His approval rating was high, and
there was still strong support by a majority of Americans for invasion
of Iraq. In short, Mr. Bush's "faith-based propaganda" [9] was still
working, and had not broken down yet.
(3) The
claim that Iraq
had a "robust nuclear program" [10] was still believable. The search
for the program had only begun recently, and many believed that it
would be discovered sooner or later. Therefore, why would the world not
believe the same claim about Iran?
(4) The
energy market,
and in particular the oil market, was not nearly as hot as what it is
today. The oil price was in the $30 range (compared with the $60 range
today), and there was still considerable oil excess capacity, implying
that if Iran's oil exports were eliminated, other oil exporters could
increase their production and compensate for the loss, just as they had
done for Iraq's production. Moreover, there was "serious" talk of
increasing Iraq's oil production to 4 million barrel/day, which has, of
course, never materialized.
(5)
Internally, the
Majles, Iran's parliament, was still controlled by vocal reformists
some of whom did not want any nuclear energy program (for example, some
members of the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization, and the
Islamic Iran Participation Front), while the rest, although supporting
the program, were advocating complete transparency in dealing with the
IAEA (with which the author agrees completely). Moreover, Mr. Mohammad
Khatami was still Iran's President, a man who wanted to make detente
with the West not confront it.
In
summary, Iran was in an extremely weak situation, and HAD TO sign the
Sa'd Abaad Agreement.
Summer
2005: Iran's Strong and Defiant Position
What has
changed in
little less two years that has made Iran confident (or, perhaps,
overconfident) that it can confront the West and come out ahead?
Consider the following:
(1)
Unlike Fall 2003,
the world now knows much about Iran's nuclear program. Yes, there are
still serious issues to be resolved (see below), but the fact is that
the IAEA has not been able to find any credible evidence - a smoking
gun so to speak - that would indicate that Iran is trying to make a
nuclear bomb.
(2)
Unlike Fall 2003,
the insurgency in Iraq is in full swing with no end in sight, which has
resulted in high US casualties, as well as huge civilian casualties
among the Iraqi population. Even the Taliban are making a come back in
Afghanistan. President Bush's approval rating has tumbled to high
thirties or low forties, some of the lowest by any president. Nearly
two-third of Americans now believe that the invasion of Iraq was a
mistake, and that it has made the US LESS secure.
(3) No
nuclear weapon,
or any "robust program" for making them, was ever discovered in Iraq.
Given that right before the invasion the IAEA had declared that there
was no such program in Iraq, and that it has also failed to find the
same in Iran, it would be difficult to believe that Iran is making a
nuclear bomb unless, of course, new dramatic evidence is uncovered.
(4) The
oil market is in
turmoil. The oil price is in the neighbourhood of $70/barrel, and there
is almost no excess capacity in other oil exporting nations left to
compensate for Iran's exports - currently about 2.7 million barrel/day
- if they are lost due to a confrontation between Iran and the US. At
the same time, Iran will make about $60-70 billion in exports, and its
foreign debts and obligations are minimal, only about $10 billion. In
short, Iran's vulnerability to a worldwide economic sanction (as
unlikely as it is) could not be any less.
(5)
Through relatively
democratic elections, a Shiite-dominated government is now ruling Iraq,
led by men who spent years in Iran in exile. When Iraq's Prime
Minister, Dr. Ebrahim Al-Jafari, who speaks Persian fluently, visited
Iran recently, he put a wreath on Ayatollah Khomeini's grave. He
admitted Iraq's responsibility and fault for starting the Iran-Iraq war
in 1980, and asked Iran to help it train its armed forces. When Mr.
Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's (former) Foreign Minister, visited Iraq
recently, he visited Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most powerful man in
Iraq, if not in the entire Shiite world. Ayatollah Sistani has never
granted an audience to any Western official. At the same time, radical
Iranian elements and factions can create immense problems in Iraq, way
beyond what is currently happening there.
(6) China
and India, the
two most populous nations, have signed huge contracts with Iran, worth
well over $100 billion, to import oil and gas from Iran, hence making
them dependent on Iran. India is the largest democracy in the world,
while China is the up-and-coming superpower. Hence, these countries
provide Iran with political support. In particular, it is plausible
(but not certain) that China may veto any resolution against Iran, if
its nuclear energy program is referred to the UN Security Council.
Russia might do the same, since it has great stake in its nuclear
copperation with Iran. But, their veto is not by any means guaranteed.
(7) The
emergence of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), consisting of China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO goes back
to 1996 when China initiated the Shanghai Five, which included all the
current SCO members except for Uzbekistan. The purpose of SCO is to
form a network of cooperation among the member States, including
military security, economic development, trade and cultural exchange.
In its most recent meeting on July 5, 2005, the SCO invited Iran to
participate as an observer, which Iran did. Iran is likely to join the
SCO sometime in the near future, which will provide it with further
political support. The SCO has started asserting itself and flexing its
political muscles, with Uzbekistan recently asking the US to evacuate
its military forces out of the country, which the US will do soon.
Clearly, if the US troops leave Central Asia, it will be an important
positive development for Iran.
(8) Iran
has started
receiving the proceeds from its oil exports in Euro rather than dollar.
Over a period time, it will stop receiving dollar altogether, and will
completely switch to Euro. This will not only provide more financial
stability and security for Iran's foreign exchange reserves, but also
will have a negative impact on the oil market in New York.
(9)
Internally, the
Majles, the presidency, the armed forces, and the judiciary are all
controlled by Iran's right wing. Although Iran's right itself is
factionalized, but history indicates that when it comes to a common
enemy, it becomes completely united.
Thus,
Iran is in a
strong position which explains its belligerence and defiance. At the
same time, unlike what is claimed in the Western Press, Iran's defiance
is NOT due to the election of Mr. Ahmadinejad as its new president,
rather, as the above discussion should make it clear, is due mostly to
the international developments.
Iran's
Proposal to the EU Troika
In
addition to the
above, what contributes to Iran's position strong is the following. For
sometime Iran was focused on providing the EU troika with the
"objective guarantees" of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
In fact, on March 23, 2005, Iran submitted to the EU troika a plan of
objetive guarantees with the following elements [11]:
(1) Spent
reactor fuels will not be reprocessed by Iran, so that no plutonium can
be extracted to be used for bomb making.
(2) Iran
will forego plutonium production through a heavy water reactor.
(3) Only
low-enriched uranium will be produced.
(4) A
limit will be imposed on the enrichment level, to be used solely as
fuel for reactors.
(5) A
limit will be imposed on the amount of enrichment, restricting it to
what is needed for Iran's reactors.
(6) All
the low-enriched
uranium will be converted immediately to fuel rods for use in reactors
(fuel rods cannot be further enriched).
(7) The
number of
centrifuges in Natanz can be limited, at least at the beginning. The
full operation of the fuel cycle will be incremental, beginning with
the least sensitive part, such as uranium conversion.
(8) The
IAEA will have permanent on-site presence at all the facilities for
uranium conversion and enrichment.
Items
(1)-(7) that Iran
has offered to limit, or to give up altogether, are actually allowed by
Article IV of the NPT. Therefore, any objective person who is even
remotely familiar with producing fuels for nuclear reactors would agree
that what Iran proposed in March 2005 was a substantial, if not
complete, step towards providing the EU troika and the US with the
"objective guarantees" that they are supposedly looking for. In fact,
item (8) goes even beyond the provisions of the Additional Protocol on
the NPT that Iran signed in December 2003, and has been implementing
ever since. At the minimum, Iran's proposal could have been the basis
for further negotiations. But, the EU negotiators never responded to
Iran's offer; they simply ignored it, hence demonstrating their
nations' utter arrogance [12].
The
Proposal of the EU Troika to Iran
The
long-awaited
proposal by the EU troika, "The Framework for a Long-Term Agreement,"
was submitted to Iran in early August. In the author's opinion, the
proposal does contain several important elements. For example,
(1) it
tries to force
Iran to commit to combating terrorism (article 9), hence stopping many
adventuresome aspects of Iran's foreign policy over the past twenty
five years, such as supporting radical groups in the Middle East, which
have done nothing but grossly damaging Iran's national interests;
(2) it
recognizes Iran's
right to developing the infrastructure for peaceful use of nuclear
energy and research (articles 14 and 15) (these rights have, however,
been recognized by the NPT);
(3) it
recognizes Iran's right to have access to "international nuclear
technology market" (article 18);
(4) it
offers to provide expert help for safety aspects of Iran's program
(article 20b);
(5) it
offers to facilitate Iran's access to the international market for
nuclear reactors fuels (article 23);
(6) it
offers to help
Iran develop a "buffer store" of 5 years of fuel supplies for the
reactors in case either the supplies dry up, or the suppliers refuse to
provide Iran more fuels for the reactors (article 30), and
(7) it
proposes a mechanism for addressing the situation that arises in (6)
(articles 27-29), although the mechanism is tedious.
However,
certain aspects
of the EU proposal are either against the existing international
agreements, or their language is vague and leaves a lot to be desired.
For example, the proposal demands that Iran (emphasis with capital
letters added)
"make a
legally binding
commitment not to withdraw from the NPT and to keep all Iranian nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguarded UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES" (article
36a).
The
commitment not to
withdraw from the NPT is even against the NPT itself, which allows the
member States to withdraw from the agreement, subject to giving a 90
days notice to the IAEA, if the States believe that abiding by the
terms of the NPT threatens their national security, and withdrawing
from the NPT is in their "Supreme Interest."
At the
same time, why is
Iran's case so different that requires new skewed interpretation of the
NPT's provisions, or creating new obligations for Iran that do not even
exist in the international agreements regarding nuclear weapons? If
Iran has violated certain aspects of the Safeguards Agreement by not
reporting to the IAEA what it has been doing (which is still a matter
of debate), it has not been the LONE violator. Over the past year
alone, the IAEA has reported that South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt have,
at various times, violated the provisions of the NPT by secretly
engaging in experiments on uranium enrichment and even bomb making.
Brazil, a country that provided nuclear assistance to Saddam Hussein's
regime in the 1980, refused, for a long time, granting permission to
the IAEA to visit and inspect its uranium enrichment facilities under
construction. Where is the international outcry over these violations?
Therefore,
if Iran is to
make a commitment not to withdraw from the NPT, the logical first step
is to revise the terms of the NPT agreement, so that the commitment
would become binding for ALL the member States, not just Iran. In
addition, the revisions must address the all important issue of what to
do about nuclear powers that are NOT signatories to the NPT, namely,
India, Israel, and Pakistan, all in Iran's vicinity, with the latter
two posing great threats to Iran's national security.
In
addition, the
"Political and Security Co-Operation" section of the EU proposal leaves
a lot to be desired. Let us review a portion of it (article 4):
"Within
the context of
an overall agreement and Iran's fulfilment of its obligations under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United
Kingdom and France would be prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral
security assurances given on 6 April 1995, and referred to in United
Nations Security-Council Resolution 984 (1995). Specifically:
the
United Kingdom and
the French Republic would reaffirm to Iran that they will not use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an
invasion or ANY attack on them, their dependent territories, their
armed forces, or other troops, their allies or on a State towards which
they have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a
non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a
nuclear-weapon State...."
Such
guarantees actually
leave open the possibility of a nuclear or even non-nuclear attack on
Iran because, as is clear in the above paragraph, immediately after
promising not to attack Iran, a long list of "exceptional" cases which
can provoke an attack is mentioned. Moreover, Iraq was invaded and
occupied not through a nuclear attack, but by conventional forces. So,
the question is, where is the guarantee that Britain and France (and,
for that matter, Germany) will not participate in a war similar to the
invasion of Iraq using conventional forces?
Even if
full guarantees,
with no ifs, buts, and exceptions, are provided, where is the guarantee
that the US will not attack Iran? Where is the guarantee that its
proxies, such as Israel, will not attack Iran? The proposal is silent
about these aspects, except where it states that (article 4b):
"the
United Kingdom and
the French Republic would recall and reaffirm, as Permanent Members of
the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to
provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter [of the UN], to any
non-nuclear State, party to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a
threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used."
In other
words, the
proposal guarantees nothing when it comes to the use of conventional
forces, and even in the case of an aggression in which nuclear weapons
are used, all the EU troika will do will be seeking "immediate Security
Council action," presumably after tens (if not hundreds) of thousands
of innocent people have already perished during the aggression.
The
New IAEA Report and its Absurd Demands
As
mentioned above, two
years ago the EU troika insisted through the Sa'd Abaad Agreement that
Iran must "voluntarily" sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which
Iran did and began implementing. But, in his September 3, 2005 report
to the BOG of the IAEA [13] entitled, "Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", Dr. Mohamed
ElBaradei, chief of the IAEA, has reported on the following item:
(1) Iran
has submitted
to the IAEA comprehensive declarations with respect to its nuclear
facilities, including design information (article 5).
(2) In
view of Iran's
steady cooperation and increasing transparency, resolving the
outstanding concerns (see below), the IAEA believes that Iran's nuclear
issue "would be followed up as matters of routine safeguards" (article
6).
(3) Other
than some
delays and slowness in providing information on the design aspects, "no
additional failures have been identified" by the IAEA (article 8).
(4)
Certain aspects of
Iran's previous declarations, especially the "outstanding issue" of the
sources of contamination of Iran's equipment with high-enriched uranium
which has turned out to be Pakistan (as had been widely believed), have
been verified (article 12).
(5)
Several Iranian
"transparency measures," well beyond the Additional Protocol, are
reported, including allowing inspection access to Iran's military bases
(article 37).
(6) The
report cites "good progress" in Iran's "corrective measures" since
October 2003 (article 43).
(7) The
report declares
that, "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted
for, and therefore such material has not been diverted to prohibited
activities" (article 51).
(8) The
report confirms
again again that Iran's uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz have
remained suspended; that the converted uranium had been relocated to
safe storages, and that the uranium hexafluoride "remained under agency
seals" (article 59).
(9) It
admits that, "the
agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear
weapons-related activity is limited" (article 49).
This is,
of course, a
basic problem of the non-proliferation regime which transcends Iran,
but is being selectively applied to Iran. After admitting this general
shortcoming, the report states that Iran's transparency (emphasis with
capital letters added)
(10)
"should extend
beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol and include ACCESS TO INDIVIDUALS, documentation
related to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain MILITARY-OWNED
WORKSHOPS and research and development locations" (article 50).
Such
demands are clearly
pure political pressure far beyond any requirements demanded by the NPT
and its Additional Protocol. In fact, Iran is being asked to comply
with demands that are reminiscent of what Iraq was being asked to do in
the months leading to its illegal invasion by the US and Britain. In
essence, what the report is demanding is that Iran should reveal its
sensitive military information. If Iran were to go along, where would
the demand list end?
In
addition, it is not
even clear why, with so many positive aspects of Iran's cooperation
with the IAEA reported by the IAEA, Iran should accede to such
additional demands. This is particularly baffling in view of the IAEA's
own discovery about Iran's deals with Pakistan's Abdul Ghadeer Khan,
indicating that Iran turned down his offers of nuclear-weapons designs
in the 1980s, which should reinforce Iran's position that it is not
interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. What happened to President
Bush's declaration at the National Defense University on February 11,
2004 that, "I propose that by next year, only States that have signed
the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civil
nuclear programs"?
Lack
of Mutual Trust and the Emerging Crisis
Given the
above, the
question is: What is REALLY at issue in the confrontation between Iran,
the EU troika, and the US? The issue, as Dillip Hiro [14] put it, is:
"Do Third
World
countries have the right to develop and use all nuclear technology,
including enrichment, as authorized by the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty, or not?"
Iran
believes that the
answer is an unequivocal "Yes," and is not alone in its stance: The
Non-Aligned Movement, which has a membership of 116 nations (and
includes such important nations with nuclear technology as Brazil,
India, and South Africa), agrees. So, whether intended or not, Iran has
become the champion of the developing nations, willing to stand up to
the Western world. Moreover, whether we like it or not, Iran's stance
has won it quiet admiration by Non-Aligned nations, as they fear that
the limitations that the EU and the US are trying to impose on Iran
could be extended to them eventually.
The EU
troika does not
deny the right. But it (and the US) wants Iran to give up its rights
under the NPT FOREVER (article 34 of the EU proposal) in return for the
commitments described above.
Why do
the EU and the US
want Iran to give up its right for having the complete cycle for
producing enriched uranium? Their main argument is that, since Iran hid
its nuclear energy program for 18 years, it has, in essence, given up
that right. In essence, it is, more than anything else, an issue of
trust between two hostile sides. As President Bush stated in a news
conference on April 28, 2005, at the White House,
"America
recognises that
we cannot trust the Iranians when it comes to enriching uranium . . .
they should not be allowed to enrich uranium."
In the
author's opinion,
there is not much merit to the argument that, "we do not trust Iran
because it hid its nuclear program." To see why consider the following:
(1) As
explained in Part
II of this series, beginning in 1982, Iran started pursuing Germany to
complete the reactors in Bushehr. It tried any and all the reasonable
(and some not so reasonable) approaches in order to get Germany live up
to its obligations; it never succeeded. If anything, Iran's efforts
were indicating clearly to the West that it WAS pursuing a nuclear
program. At the same time, the (West) German intelligence agency was
the first to declare in 1984 that, "Iran was only TWO YEARS away from a
nuclear bomb" [15].
(2) As
noted in Ref.
[6], under the provisions of the Safeguard Agreement of IAEA, building
the Natanz facility and not declaring it were NOT illegal (though they
were clandestine), so long as 180 days before introducing any nuclear
materials into the facility Iran notified the IAEA, which Iran did long
before the 180 days period. As has been emphasized in this series of
articles, the difference between being clandestine and illegal has not
been understood in the Western press; constructing the Natanz facility
is constantly referred to as Iran's "breach of its obligations."
(3) The
truth is that
the EU troika and the US do not wish Iran to have the uranium
enrichment facilities, REGARDLESS of what Iran does or does not. To see
this one only needs to consider Iran's proposal of March 2005. At the
same time, does anyone really believe that if, in 1985, Iran had
declared its intention for constructing its present enrichment
facilities, the US and the EU troika would have rushed in to help it,
or even allowed Iran to proceed? It is difficult, if not impossible, to
imagine any scenario under which this would have happened. So, the
issue is not one of hiding something, rather not wanting Iran to
possess the enrichment facilities and technology under any
circumstances.
However,
Iran's
reactionary right has done too many things to make the world suspicious
or distrustful of Iran, some of which, in the author's opinion, are as
follows.
(1) The
hardliners have
suppressed Iran's democratic movement and violated, on a steady and
consistent basis, the personal, social, political, and economical
rights of Iranians. In fact, in the author's opinion, lost in the
international fury over Iran's nuclear energy program has been the fact
that, respect for human rights and a democratic political system are
the most effective deterrent against the threat that any aspiring
nuclear power run by an undemocratic government may pose to the world.
When the US strongly pushed the Shah to start Iran's nuclear energy
program at a time that it had no economic justification (see Parts II
and IV of this series), instead of pushing him to undertake meaningful
political reforms, it helped creating the Frankstein now called Iran's
nuclear program.
A
democratic political
system in Iran greatly reduces and even eliminates the threat that its
nuclear program may pose to the world because, in the author's opinion,
the danger per se is not that Iran may have nuclear weapons (which it
does not), but that some of its most important power centers and
decision-making process are shrouded with secrecy. A free press in Iran
- a pillar of human rights - will reveal nuclear adventures that Iran's
hidden power centers may pursue against Iran's national interests [16].
Since
1970s, when the
Shah started Iran's nuclear program, India, South Africa, North Korea,
Pakistan, and Israel have joined the nuclear club. In the 1980s South
Africa's apartheid regime produced nuclear bombs, but the democratic
government of Nelson Mandella dismantled them. India, has developed a
nuclear arsenal, but not many perceive world's largest democracy as a
threat to the world. The same is true about Israel.
But,
North Korea's
nuclear arsenal is a threat because its regime is highly secretive and
its leader a recluse. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is extremely dangerous
(even if the US does not acknowledge it) because Pakistan is an
essentially failed State. Its nuclear-armed military, populated by
Islamic extremists, created the Taliban which supported Osama bin
Laden. Pakistan has a sectarian war in which the majority Sunni
population has been murdering the Shiite minority, and many of its
schools teach Islamic radicalism. Could Abdul Ghadeer Khan, the founder
and owner of Pakistan's nuclear supermarket, have operated freely for
so long without the support of some elements of its military? Could he
have operated in a democratic Pakistan with a free press to reveal the
depth of his dangerous enterprise?
Aside
from the nature of
Iran's hardliners which cannot be conducive to building trust between
Iran and the international community, several questions about Iran's
nuclear energy program remain unresolved:
(2) When
did Iran obtain the design for the advanced P-2 centrifuges? Why did it
not pursue its construction? or, has it?
(3) Why
did Iran
experiment for sometime uranium enrichment using lasers? Surely, laser
enrichment is not economical, and can be justified only in the
framework of a military program for which there is no limit to the
budget that can be spent.
(4) Why
was the Bandar
Abbas uranium mine not declared to the IAEA for quite some time? How
much uranium deposits does Iran possess, any way [17]?
(5) At
least three
companies - Kaalaa-ye Electric, Pars Taraash, and Faraayand Technic -
supposedly having nothing to do with Iran's nuclear program - have
turned out to be providing support for it. Iran must be prepared to
address the issue of such companies in a systematic way, because it is
likely that the IAEA will press Iran on this issue in the future.
But, this
is not the
complete story, but only half of it. The lack of trust between Iran,
the EU, and the US is also due to the other half of the story, which is
about the "guarantees" given by France, Germany, and the US to Iran
that later on turned out to be "non-binding." Consider the following
(which represents just the tip of the iceberg) [18]:
(1) As
described in Part
I and mentioned above, Germany was supposed to build two nuclear
reactors in Bushehr. The construction of the reactors was begun and
made considerable progress. But Germany stopped the work after the
Iranian Revolution. It neither paid Iran back what it owed, nor did it
finish building the reactors, nor delivered the parts that had already
been purchased and paid for.
(2) Iran
paid in 1975 $1
billion to buy 10% of Eurodif, a French company that produces enriched
uranium. In return Iran was supposed to receive enriched uranium for
its reactors, but has never received any. France was also supposed to
construct nuclear reactors in Khuzestan province, but it never did.
(3) The
Shah spent
billions of dollars in the 1970s to purchase US made weapons. The US
was obligated to provide Iran with the spare parts for the weapons.
But, when the Iran-Iraq war began, the US refused to supply Iran with
the spare parts which had already been paid for. But the US did not
stop there. Donald Rumsfeld travelled to Baghdad in December 1983, had
a friendly meeting with Saddam Hussein, and informed him that the US,
although officially neutral, was going to "tilt" towards Iraq. The US
then started supplying Iraq with detailed information on troops
movement in Iran, and other valuable information.
(4)
Historical factors
also play important roles in the distrust of the Europeans by Iran. The
Golestan and Turkmenchaay Treaties, signed in 1811 and 1827 between
Iran and Russia, forced Iran to give up, under force, a large portion
of its historical territories. Later on in 1867, the British empire did
the same to Iran when it used force to separate Afghanistan from Iran.
The 1953 coup d'etat overthrew the government of Iran's national hero,
Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh. These historial events, with gigantic
implications, have left deep scars on Iran's historial memory.
Therefore,
the lack of
trust between Iran, the EU, and the US is mutual. While the EU nations
have many good reasons to distrust Iran, they also have a track record
of promises that they had made to, and obligations that they had
towards, Iran, which were broken and violated later on.
Iran's
Technical Problems: A Reason for Caution
While the
Western Press
has been trying to create a menacing image of Iran's nuclear energy
program, now that the Esfahan facility has started operating again, the
reality, which should prevent the EU from panicking, is quite
different. The fact is that Iran faces many difficulties in operating
both the Esfahan and Natanz facilities [19,20], with the latter
facility being currently sealed, anyway. Iran had major problems with
the Esfahan facility in 2004 when it produced uranium hexafluoride,
which was unsuitable for enrichment because it contained impurities
that prevent its enrichment. Another problem is obtaining suitable
materials for handling and storing uranium hexafluoride, which is in a
solid state at room temperature, but makes a transition to the gaseous
state at about 135 F. Whether Iran has overcome such difficulties is
not known yet. A third problem Iran is facing is about its centrifuge
facility at Natanz. Apparently, Iran has been unable to keep the
centrifuges running for a sufficient length of time at the required
speeds.
At the
same time, most
experts believe that the IAEA inspections and safeguards will prevent
Iran from directly using facilities declared to the IAEA for its
weapons program (if one exists), so long as Iran does not withdraw from
the NPT. A November 2004 report by the CIA supported these assertions.
However, if Iran's program is referred to the Security Council, and the
Council imposes tough sanctions against Iran (the possibility of which
AT PRESENT is remote), Iran may withdraw from the NPT and expel its
inspectors. Then, what Iran's hardliners do next is anybody's guess. It
is not in the interest of the world to arrive at such a frightening
moment.
Summary:
Is Defiance in Iran's National Interest?
In the
author's opinion,
although Iran's current position is very strong, it is not in its
national interest to be referred to the UN Security Council. The reason
is threefold:
(1)
Although Russia and
China are both opposed to referring Iran's nuclear program to the
United Nations Security Council, their veto of a resolution against
Iran is NOT guaranteed. An approved resolution, even if it is mild,
will be used by the War Party in the US as an exuse for staging
military attack against Iran.
(2) If
the Security
Council does pass some resolution against Iran, it will have the
legitimacy of the UN and, therefore, Iran will be isolated. In short,
Iran must realize that, (i) it cannot afford to lose in the court of
public opinion, and (2) while it might win the current battles with the
EU troika, it may lose the ultimate war at the Security Council.
(3)
Although Iran is
entitled to having the complete cycle for producing enriched uranium,
it does not have any urgent need for it. The fuel for the Bushehr
reactor has been guaranteed by Russia, and any new reactor to be
constructed in Iran is years away. Thus, once again, there is no need
to put Iran in a position where the War Party in the US may become
tempted to attack it, which would inflict immeasurable damage on Iran's
industrial and population centers. Protecting Iran against such attacks
is far more important than having the cycle for enriching uranium:
Without a prosperous and safe Iran it makes no sense to speak of
uranium enrichment.
At the
same time, the EU and the US must also realize the following:
(1)
Referring Iran to
the Security Council is not in the interest of the international
community, because in that case Iran may carry out its threat of
withdrawing from the NPT. That would destroy the already troubled
non-proliferation regime and, instead of full transparency, the IAEA
will find Iran back in the pre-2003 era.
(2) In
addition to being
economically viable and necessary, Iran's nuclear energy program also
has to do with nationalism and pride. If the EU and the US ignore this
aspect, it will cause lasting repercussions, setting back the relations
between Iran, the US, and the EU for a long time.
(3) In
the author's
opinion, the way to address the problem of Iran's nuclear program is
not by threatening it with military strikes, but by providing Iran with
incentives to move towards a democratic and transparent political
system which would make its nuclear program benign. The Achiles' heel
of Iran's hardliners is not their possible violation of Iran's
international nuclear obligations that may drag them before the
Security Council to bring about their eventual fall, but their
violation of human rights of Iranians, including suffocating Iran's
independent press.
(4) It is
no accident
that Iran's nuclear program began accelerating in 1997 when Mohammad
Khatami was elected president, and began implementing a program of
reform and more transparency. Since then, instead of helping Iran's
fledgling democratic movement, which would have inevitably led to
transparency in its nuclear program, the US has been hurting it.
Whereas Mr. Khatami proposed people-to-people dialogue between the US
and Iran, the US has prevented Iranian scholars and authors from
publishing their work in the US. Whereas Iran greatly helped the US in
the war in Afghanistan, the US bestowed upon it the "honour" of being a
member of "Axis of Evil!" In return for the overwhelming victory of
Iran's democratic forces in the 2000 elections for the Majles, the US
lifted sanctions against importing Iranian pistachios! The US repeats
the claim that Iran does not need nuclear energy because it has plenty
of oil and natural gas, yet it has blocked the US oil companies to
invest in Iran's oil industry. It is because of such contradictions in
the US policy towards Iran that it is difficult for ANY Iranian leader
to trust the US.
The
proposals by Iran
and the EU both have many positive elements. The Natanz facility
remains suspended and sealed, and Iran faces many technical
difficulties to operate a complete uranium enrichment cycle. Hence,
there is no reason for the EU to panic just because the conversion of
the yellow cake to uranium tetra- and hexafluoride, which the IAEA does
not even consider as part of an enrichment process, has started.
Through patience, flexibility, and mutual understanding, the two
proposals can be combined into one coherent proposal that satisfies
Iran's aspirations and the EU's and the US' concerns.
References
and notes
[1] See,
Dafna Linzer, "Past Arguments Don't Square with Current Iran Policy,"
the Washington Post, March 27, 2005.
[2] See
Parts IV and V
of this series for detailed discussions of this point. See also, T.R.
Stauffer, "Unlike Dimona, Iran's Bushehr Reactor Not Useful for
Weapons-Grade Plutonium," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs
(September 2003), p. 28, as well as,
www.washington-report.org/archives/sept03/0309028.html
[3] A
good example of
such quasi-democratic groups is an Iranian political journalist based
in Europe and his cohorts in Los Angeles. They repeat, VERBATIM,
whatever non-sense the neo-conservatives claim about Iraq and Iran. The
same people had a "joyous" (sickening to the author though) scream on
an Iranian satellite TV channel on March 19, 2003 - the day the US and
Britain began their illegal invasion of Iraq - stating their hope and
dream that, "Iran will soon have such a day." What has been happening
in Iraq since then has not, of course, made them reconsider their
"wish," simply because they do not understand a simple fact: Without
defending Iran's national interests, it is meaningless to speak of
democracy and human rights.
[4] On
July 5, 2005, at
a joint news conference with France's Foreign Minister Philippe
Douste-Blazy, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, "the United
States does not see the need for a civilian nuclear program in oil-rich
Iran," despite the fact that in the same news conference she said that
the US strongly supports the EU-Iran neogotiations, and that the EU has
recognized Iran's right and need for NPPs. To read about the news
conference see, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48932.htm
[5] M.
Sahimi, P.
Mojtahedzadeh, and K.L. Afrasiabi, "Iran Needs Nuclear Reactors,"
International Herald Tribune, October 14, 2003.
[6] M.
Sahimi, "Forced
to Fuel: Iran's Nuclear Energy Program," Harvard International Review,
Volume XXVI (No. 4), Winter 2005, p. 42.
[7]
According to the
original IAEA Safeguard agreements, Iran was not obligated to declare
the start of construction of the Natanz facility for uranium
enrichment. These agreements stipulate that, only 180 days before
introducing any nuclear material, must Iran declare the existence of
the facility. Therefore, construction of the undeclared Natanz facility
is NOT by itself a violation of the NPT. In addition, the NPT does
allow Iran to legally build any nuclear facility, including one for
uranium enrichment, so long as it is declared to, and safeguarded by,
the IAEA, and is intended for peaceful purposes.
[8] The
latest US
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program states that
Iran is about 10 years away from making a nuclear bomb. See, Dafna
Linzer, "Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb," The Washington
Post, August 1, 2005. To view the article, see,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080101453.html
See also Refs. [19] and [20] below.
[9] This
phrase was taken from F. Rich's column, "Falluja Floods the Superdome,"
The New York Times, September 4, 2005.
[10] This
is the phrase that Vice President Dick Cheney used frequently prior to
invasion of Iraq.
[11]
Excellent
discussions of Iran's proposal are given by G. Prather (a physicist who
has worked in the Departments of Energy and Defence). See, for example,
"What the Neo-Crazies Knew," August 13, 2005, in
www.antiwar.com/prather/?article=6269 See also Prather's August 8, 2005
article, "EU vs. Iran: Who's Right?" at
www.antiwar.com/prather/?article=6901
[12] See
also, T. Parsi,
"Europe's Mendacity Doomed Iran Talks to Failure," the Financial Times
of London, August 30, 2005. To view the article, see
news.ft.com/cms/s/0cfd2c90-1980-11da-804e-00000e2511c8.html
[13] For
a thorough
analysis of the IAEA report see, K.L. Afrasiabi, "ElBaradei's Report
Deconstructed," September 7, 2005, at
atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GI07Ak05.html
[14]
Dillip Hiro,
"Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," the Nation Magazine, September 12, 2005. To
view the article see, www.thenation.com/doc/20050912/hiro
[15] D.
Leglu, Liberation (Paris), April 29, 1984.
[16] See
also, Shirin Ebadi and M. Sahimi, "In the Mullahs' Shadow," the Wall
Street Journal, June 15, 2005.
[17]
Estimates on Iran's
natural uranium deposits vary widely. They range anywhere from enough
deposits to produce fuel for only one 1000 MW reactor for 6-7 years,
which is what the US claims (hence pointing out that such small
deposits do not justify an enrichment program, unless it is for
military purposes), to much larger amounts cited in Part II of this
series. The true amount is likely to be something in between.
[18] See
also, F.
Mokhtari, "Coping with Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," the Los Angeles
Times, August 22, 2005. To view the article see,
www.latimes.com/opinion/printedition/california/la-oe-mokhtari22aug22,1,
1689359.story?coll=la-headlines-pe-california
[19] P.
Kerr, "Back to
Normal, Iran Nuclear Abilities Limited," Arms Control Association,
September 6, 2005. To view the article see,
www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/IranLimits.asp?print/act/2005_09/IranLimits.asp
[20] See
also, A.
Cowell, "Nuclear Weapon is Years off for Iran, Research Panel Says,"
the New York Times, Wednesday September 8, 2005, p. A11.
Original
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About
the author:
Muhammad Sahimi is Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials
Science, and NIOC Professor of Petroleum Engineering at the University
of Southern California in Los Angeles. Since 1986 he has been a member
of the Union of Concerned Scientists - an organization dedicated to
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons - and a contributor to its
Partners for Earth Program. He has also been a visiting professor in
Australia, Europe, and the Middle East, and a consultant to many energy
firms around the world. In addition to his scientific work, his
political articles have appeared as book chapters, on various websites,
and in such publications as the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street
Journal.
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