March 8, 1992
U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop
A One-Superpower World
Pentagon’s Document Outlines Ways to Thwart Challenges
to Primacy of America
By
Patrick E. Tyler
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 7 – In a broad new policy statement
that is in its
final drafting phase, the Defense Department asserts that America’s
political and military mission in the post-cold-war era will be to
ensure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe,
Asia or the territories of the former Soviet Union.
A 46-page document that has been circulating at the
highest levels
of the Pentagon for weeks, and which Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
expects to release later this month, states that part of the American
mission will be “convincing potential competitors that they need not
aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect
their legitimate interests.”
The classified document makes the case for a world
dominated by one
superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior
and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations
from challenging American primacy.
Rejecting Collective Approach
To perpetuate this role, the United States “must
sufficiently
account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to
discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn
the established political and economic order,” the document states.
With its focus on this concept of benevolent domination
by one
power, the Pentagon document articulates the clearest rejection to date
of collective internationalism, the strategy that emerged from World
War II when the five victorious powers sought to form a United Nations
that could mediate disputes and police outbreaks of violence.
Though the document is internal to the Pentagon and is
not provided
to Congress, its policy statements are developed in conjunction with
the National Security Council and in consultation with the President or
his senior national security advisers. Its drafting has been supervised
by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary for Policy. Mr.
Wolfowitz often represents the Pentagon on the Deputies Committee,
which formulates policy in an interagency process dominated by the
State and Defense Departments.
The document was provided to The New York Times by an
official who
believes this post-cold-war strategy debate should be carried out in
the public domain. It seems likely to provoke further debate in
Congress and among America’s allies about Washington’s willingness to
tolerate greater aspirations for regional leadership from a united
Europe or from a more assertive Japan.
Together with its attachment on force levels required to
insure
America’s predominant role, the policy draft is a detailed
justification for the Bush Administration’s “base force” proposal to
support a 1.6-million member military over the next five years, at a
cost of about $1.2 trillion. Many Democrats in Congress have criticized
the proposal as unnecessarily expensive.
Implicitly, the document foresees building a world
security
arrangement that pre-empts Germany or Japan from pursuing a course of
substantial rearmament, especially nuclear armament, in the future.
In its opening paragraph, the policy document heralds
the “less
visible” victory at the end of the cold war, which it defines as the
“integration of Germany and Japan into a U.S.-led system of collective
security and the creation of a democratic ‘zone of peace.’”
The continuation of this strategic goal explains the
strong emphasis
elsewhere in the document and in other Pentagon planning on using
military force, if necessary, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in such countries as
North Korea, Iraq, some of the successor republics to the Soviet Union
and in Europe.
Nuclear proliferation, if unchecked by superpower
action, could
tempt Germany, Japan and other industrial powers to acquire nuclear
weapons to deter attack from regional foes. This could start them down
the road to global competition with the United States and, in a crisis
over national interests, military rivalry.
The policy draft appears to be adjusting the role of the
American
nuclear arsenal in the new era, saying, “Our nuclear forces also
provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of a
revitalized or unforeseen global threat, while at the same time helping
to deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction through the
threat of retaliation.”
U.N. Action Ignored The document is conspicuously devoid
of
references to collective action through the United Nations, which
provided the mandate for the allied assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait
and which may soon be asked to provide a new mandate to force President
Saddam Hussein to comply with his cease-fire obligations.
The draft notes that coalitions “hold considerable
promise for
promoting collective action” as in the Persian Gulf war, but that “we
should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not
lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying
only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished.”
What is most important, it says, is “the sense that the
world order
is ultimately backed by the U.S.” and “the United States should be
postured to act independently when collective action cannot be
orchestrated” or in a crisis that demands quick response.
Bush Administration officials have been saying publicly
for some
time that they were willing to work within the framework of the United
Nations, but that they reserve the option to act unilaterally or
through selective coalitions, if necessary, to protect vital American
interests.
But this publicly stated strategy did not rule out an
eventual
leveling of American power as world security stabilizes and as other
nations place greater emphasis on collective international action
through the United Nations.
In contrast, the new draft sketches a world in which
there is one
dominant military power whose leaders “must maintain the mechanisms for
deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional
or global role.”
Sent to Administrators
The document is known in Pentagon parlance as the
Defense Planning
Guidance, an internal Administration policy statement that is
distributed to the military leaders and civilian Defense Department
heads to instruct them on how to prepare their forces, budgets and
strategy for the remainder of the decade. The policy guidance is
typically prepared every two years, and the current draft will yield
the first such document produced after the end of the cold war.
Senior Defense Department officials have said the
document will be
issued by Defense Secretary Cheney this month. According to a Feb. 18
memorandum from Mr. Wolfowitz’s deputy, Dale A. Vesser, the policy
guidance will be issued with a set of “illustrative” scenarios for
possible future foreign conflicts that might draw United States
military forces into combat.
These scenarios, issued separately to the military
services on Feb.
4, were detailed in a New York Times article last month. They
postulated regional wars against Iraq and North Korea, as well as a
Russian assault on Lithuania and smaller military contingencies that
United States forces might confront in the future.
These hypothetical conflicts, coupled with the policy
guidance
document, are meant to give military leaders specific information about
the kinds of military threats they should be prepared to meet as they
train and equip their forces. It is also intended to give them a
coherent strategy framework in which to evaluate various force and
training options.
Fears of Proliferation
In assessing future threats, the document places great
emphasis on
how “the actual use of weapons of mass destruction, even in conflicts
that do not directly engage U.S. interests, could spur further
proliferation which in turn would threaten world order.”
“The U.S. may be faced with the question of whether to
take military
steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass
destruction,” it states, noting that those steps could include
pre-empting an impending attack with nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons or “punishing the attackers or threatening punishment of
aggressors through a variety of means,” including attacks on the plants
that manufacture such weapons.
Noting that the 1968 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty is up
for renewal
in 1995, the document says, “should it fail, there could ensue a
potentially radical destabilizing process” that would produce
unspecified “critical challenges which the U.S. and concerned partners
must be prepared to address.”
The draft guidance warns that “both Cuba and North Korea
seem to be
entering intense periods of crisis – primarily economic, but also
political – which may lead the governments involved to take actions
that would otherwise seem irrational.” It adds, “the same potential
exists in China.”
For the first time since the Defense Planning Guidance
process was
initiated to shape national security policy, the new draft states that
the fragmentation of the former Soviet military establishment has
eliminated the capacity for any successor power to wage global
conventional war.
But the document qualifies its assessment, saying, “we
do not
dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in
Russia or effort to re-incorporate into Russia the newly independent
republics of Ukraine, Belarus and possibly others.”
It says that though U.S. nuclear targeting plans have
changed “to
account for welcome developments in states of the former Soviet Union,”
American strategic nuclear weapons will continue to target vital
aspects of the former Soviet military establishment. The rationale for
the continuation of this targeting policy is that the United States
“must continue to hold at risk those assets and capabilities that
current – and future – Russian leaders or other nuclear adversaries
value most” because Russia will remain “the only power in the world
with the capability of destroying the United States.”
Until such time as the Russian nuclear arsenal has been
rendered
harmless, “we continue to face the possibility of robust strategic
nuclear forces in the hands of those who might revert to closed,
authoritarian, and hostile regimes,” the document says. It calls for
the “early introduction” of a global anti-missile system.
Plan for Europe
In Europe, the Pentagon paper asserts that “a
substantial American
presence in Europe and continued cohesion within the Western alliance
remains vital,” but to avoid a competitive relationship from
developing, “we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only
security arrangements which would undermine NATO.”
The draft states that with the elimination of United
States
short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and similar weapons at sea, the
United States should not contemplate any withdrawal of its
nuclear-strike aircraft based in Europe and, in the event of a
resurgent threat from Russia, “we should plan to defend against such a
threat” farther forward on the territories of Eastern Europe “should
there be an Alliance decision to do so.”
This statement offers an explicit commitment to defend
the former
Warsaw Pact nations from Russia. It suggests that the United States
could also consider extending to Eastern and Central European nations
security commitments similar to those extended to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and other Arab states along the Persian Gulf. And to help stabilize the
economies and democratic development in Eastern Europe, the draft calls
of the European Community to offer memberships to Eastern European
countries as soon as possible.
In East Asia, the report says, the United States can
draw down its
forces further, but “we must maintain our status as a military power of
the first magnitude in the area.”
“This will enable the United States to continue to
contribute to
regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and
prevent the emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.” In addition,
the draft warns that any precipitous withdrawal of United States
military forces could provoke an unwanted response from Japan, and the
document states, “we must also sensitive to the potentially
destabilizing effects that enhanced roles on the part of our allies,
particularly Japan but also possibly Korea, might produce.”
In the event that peace negotiations between the two
Koreas succeed,
the draft recommends that the United States “should seek to maintain an
alliance relationship with a unified democratic Korea.”
Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence
of a New Rival’
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 7 – Following are excerpts from the
Pentagon’s
Feb. 18 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years
1994-1999:
This Defense Planning guidance addresses the
fundamentally new
situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and
the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions
and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped
by the victory of the United States and its coalition allies over Iraqi
aggression – the first post-cold-war conflict and a defining event in
U.S. global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has
been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a
U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic
“zone of peace.”
•
•
•
DEFENSE STRATEGY OBJECTIVES
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival,
either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that
poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.
This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense
strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power
from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated
control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include
Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union,
and Southwest Asia.
There are three additional aspects to this objective:
First, the
U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new
order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that
they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive
posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the
non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of
the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our
leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and
economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global
role. An effective reconstitution capability is important here, since
it implies that a potential rival could not hope to quickly or easily
gain a predominant military position in the world.
The second objective is to address sources of regional
conflict and
instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for
international law, limit international violence, and encourage the
spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems.
These objectives are especially important in deterring conflicts or
threats in regions of security importance to the United States because
of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where we have treaty
obligations or security commitments to other nations. While the U.S.
cannot become the world’s “policeman,” by assuming responsibility for
righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for
addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our
interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously
unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may
be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily
Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional
or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics
trafficking.
•
•
•
It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to
U.S. and
Western security will re-emerge from the Eurasian heartland for many
years to come. Even in the highly unlikely event that some future
leadership in the former Soviet Union adopted strategic aims of
recovering the lost empire or otherwise threatened global interests,
the loss of Warsaw Pact allies and the subsequent and continuing
dissolution of military capability would make any hope of success
require years or more of strategic and doctrinal re-orientation and
force regeneration and redeployment, which in turn could only happen
after a lengthy political realignment and re-orientation to
authoritarian and aggressive political and economic control.
Furthermore, any such political upheaval in or among the states of the
former U.S.S.R. would be much more likely to issue in internal or
localized hostilities, rather than a concerted strategic effort to
marshal capabilities for external expansionism – the ability to project
power beyond their borders.
There are other potential nations or coalitions that
could, in the
further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of
region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on
precluding the emergence of any future potential global competitor. But
because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile,
non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we
have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs –
as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the
need to counter a global threat re-emerge ….
REGIONAL THREATS AND RISK
With the demise of a global military threat to U.S.
interests,
regional military threats, including possible conflicts arising in and
from the territory of the former Soviet Union, will be of primary
concern to the U.S. in the future. These threats are likely to arise in
regions critical to the security of the U.S. and its allies, including
Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and the
territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important interests
at stake in Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In both
cases, the U.S. will be concerned with preventing the domination of key
regions by a hostile power ….
Former Soviet Union
The former Soviet state achieved global reach and power by
consolidating control over the resources in the territory of the former
U.S.S.R. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to
consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union
to support its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in
their efforts to become peaceful democracies with market-based
economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics
would be the best possible outcome for the United States. At the same
time, we must also hedge against the possibility that democracy will
fail, with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on
regenerating aggressive military power could emerge in Russia, or that
similar regimes in other successor republics could lead to spreading
conflict within the former U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe.
•
•
•
For the immediate future, key U.S. concerns will be the
ability of
Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert
their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the
case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory,
maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent
leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other
countries.
•
•
•
Western Europe
NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation
for a stable
security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental
importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western
defense and security as well as the channel for U.S. influence and
participation in European security affairs. While the United States
supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the
emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine
NATO, particularly the alliance’s integrated command structure.
•
•
•
East-Central Europe
The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union
have gone a long way toward increasing stability and reducing the
military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in
the Russian republic, should this process continue, is likely to create
a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe. However, the U.S. must keep
in mind the long history of conflict between the states of Eastern
Europe and those of the former Soviet Union ….
The most promising avenues for anchoring the
east-central Europeans
into the West and for stabilizing their democratic institutions is
their participation in Western political and economic organizations.
East-central European membership in the (European Community) at the
earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaison …..
The U.S. could also consider extending to the
east-central European
states security commitments analogous to those we have extended to
Persian Gulf states.
•
•
•
Should there be a re-emergence of a threat from the
former Soviet
Union’s successor state, we should plan to defend against such a threat
in Eastern Europe, should there be an alliance decision to do so.
East Asia and the Pacific
… Defense of Korea will likely remain one of the most demanding major
regional contingencies …. Asia is home to the world’s greatest
concentration of traditional Communist states, with fundamental values,
governance, and policies decidedly at variance with our own and those
of our friends and allies.
To buttress the vital political and economic
relationships we have
along the Pacific rim, we must maintain our status as a military power
of the first magnitude in the area. This will enable the U.S. to
continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as
a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional
hegemon.
•
•
•
Middle East and Southwest Asia
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall
objective is to
remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S.
and Western access to the region’s oil. We also seek to deter further
aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S.
nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air
and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains
fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers
from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian
peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a role through enhanced
deterrence and improved cooperative security.
•
•
•
We will seek to prevent the further development of a
nuclear arms
race on the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, we should work to have
both countries, India and Pakistan, adhere to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place their nuclear energy facilities
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We should
discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South
Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive
U.S.-Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in
our strategy to promote stable security conditions in Southwest Asia
and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavor to rebuild our military
relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns.
Latin America
•
•
•
Cuba’s growing domestic crisis holds out the prospect
for positive
change, but over the near term, Cuba’s tenuous internal situation is
likely to generate new challenges to U.S. policy. Consequently, our
programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of Cuban
contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel
boatlift, a military provocation against the U.S. or an American ally,
or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba.
Cached/copied 11-15-07
for original link click here
- http://work.colum.edu/%7Eamiller/wolfowitz1992.htm
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